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Nota Editorial

Desde inicios de 2023, *Encuentro Latinoamericano* (*ELA*) arrancó un proceso de reestructuración que se tradujo, entre otras cosas, en el establecimiento de un nuevo Consejo Editorial, un nuevo Consejo Asesor Internacional, y un nuevo grupo de revisores. Desde entonces, los esfuerzos de quienes integran este proyecto se han orientado a impulsar un modelo de revista que vaya en consonancia con uno de los objetivos de la International Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS): promover la investigación de estudiantes y jóvenes investigadores. Integrantes del nuevo Consejo Editorial participaron como ponentes en el panel "Assessing the Course of Political Change and Democratization in Contemporary Latin America" en el 27th World Congress of Political Science de la International Political Science Association (IPSA), llevado a cabo en la bella ciudad de Buenos Aires en julio de 2023. Este panel, que formó parte de las actividades académicas de IAPSS dentro de este congreso, tuvo como objetivo analizar varios aspectos del proceso de democratización en América Latina con particular énfasis en los derechos humanos de los migrantes, los vínculos entre la percepción de exclusión y la participación política, la importancia de los actores rurales en el cambio político, y la influencia del narcotráfico sobre el proceso de democratización. Las reflexiones y argumentos presentados en este panel dan cuenta de la pertinencia de renovar el estudio del rumbo de la democratización en los diferentes países de América Latina. Sin embargo, no sólo los académicos con trayectoria pueden ofrecer puntos de vista acertados sobre esta temática sino también los estudiantes y jóvenes investigadores de la ciencia política y las relaciones internacionales. Por otro lado, no puede omitirse que las nuevas generaciones de cientistas políticos encaran obstáculos de todo tipo a su desarrollo académico y profesional. *ELA*, al igual que IAPSS, tiene como una de sus principales finalidades impulsar el progreso de quienes aspiran a construir una carrera como investigadores. Una de las formas de lograr esto es a través de la publicación y difusión de artículos de investigación y otros formatos redactados por jóvenes investigadores en los que se analizan, de forma novedosa, fenómenos y problemáticas de la región de América Latina.

En esta dirección, el nuevo Consejo Editorial, compuesto por Laura Daniela Molina, Marcos Terán-Peralta, Renáta Drávucz, Benjamin Segovia, Felipe Antonio Honorato, Monica Moreno, y Rafael Plancarte, se complace en presentar el número 1 del volumen 8 de

ELA. Este número inicia con el artículo de Giulia Pagliosa Mainardi Waltrick Martins, en el que se exploran los efectos del neoliberalismo sobre los derechos sociales en Brasil, destacando la construcción de un modelo de Estado neoliberal. Posteriormente, Elena de Oliveira Schuck analiza la circulación de pensamiento feminista en Brasil y Francia con especial atención a las condiciones que propician esto. En su ensayo, Adrián Francisco Rivera Flores discute el concepto de populismo desde una perspectiva histórica para evaluar su utilidad para el caso mexicano. Finalmente, con el horizonte puesto en la comparación, Felipe Antonio Honorato examina las condiciones históricas y sociales de inmigrantes de la República Democrática del Congo que residen centros urbanos de Bélgica, Sudáfrica, y Brasil. El Consejo Editorial desea que la lectura de estas piezas estimule la reflexión científica sobre los temas abordados y contribuya a su mejor comprensión.

Rafael Plancarte

Editor Jefe

Editorial Note

Since the beginning of 2023, *Encuentro Latinoamericano* (*ELA*) started a restructuring process that resulted, among other things, in the establishment of a new Editorial Board, a new International Advisory Committee, and a new group of reviewers. Since then, the efforts of the members of this project have been aimed at supporting a journal model that is in line with one of the objectives of the International Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS): to promote research by students and young scholars. Members of the new Editorial Board participated as panelists in the panel "Assessing the Course of Political Change and Democratization in Contemporary Latin America" at the 27th World Congress of Political Science of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), held in the lovely city of Buenos Aires in July 2023. This panel, which was part of the academic activities IAPSS within this congress, aimed to analyze various aspects of the democratization process in Latin America with particular emphasis on the human rights of migrants, the links between the perception of exclusion and political participation, the importance of rural actors in political change, and the influence of drug trafficking on the democratization process. The reflections and arguments presented in this panel show the relevance of renewing the study of the course of democratization in the different countries of Latin America. However, not only experienced scholars but also students and young researchers in political science and international relations can offer accurate points of view on this topic. On the other hand, it must be noticed that the new generations of political scientists face all kinds of obstacles to their academic and professional development. *ELA*, like IAPSS, has as one of its primary purposes to promote the progress of those who aspire to build a career as researchers. One of the ways to achieve this is through the publication and dissemination of research articles and other formats written by young scholars in which they analyze, in a novel way, phenomena and problems of the Latin American region.

In this direction, the new Editorial Board, composed of Laura Daniela Molina, Marcos Terán-Peralta, Renáta Drávucz, Benjamin Segovia, Felipe Antonio Honorato, Monica Moreno, and Rafael Plancarte, is pleased to present issue 1 of volume 8 of *ELA*. This issue opens with an article by Giulia Pagliosa Mainardi Waltrick Martins, which explores the effects of neoliberalism on social rights in Brazil, highlighting the construction of a neoliberal State model. Subsequently, Elena de Oliveira Schuck analyzes the circulation of

feminist thought in Brazil and France with particular attention to the conditions conducive to this. In his essay, Adrian Francisco Rivera Flores discusses the concept of populism from a historical perspective to evaluate its usefulness for the Mexican case. Finally, with an eye to comparison, Felipe Antonio Honorato examines the historical and social conditions of immigrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo who reside in urban centers in Belgium, South Africa, and Brazil. The Editorial Board expects that reading these manuscripts will stimulate scientific reflection on the topics addressed and contribute to a better understanding of them.

Rafael Plancarte

Editor-in-Chief

ARTÍCULOS CIENTÍFICOS

Human rights before neoliberalism: precariousness of social rights and incarceration in Brazil

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Abstract

Developed through bibliographic and documentary research, this paper aims to identify and analyze the impacts of neoliberalism on human rights, particularly on social rights in Brazil between the years of 2016 and March 2022. It sustains the hypothesis that the neoliberal model of State collides with values that constitute the foundation of human rights, which are turned into "market options", and challenges the implementation of these rights by making the market the mechanism of social regulation and releasing the State from its duty of guaranteeing social rights. Consequently, the vulnerability of the economically and socially marginalized people is intensified and, in order to control social insecurity, the State strengthens its penal arm over this population. In Brazil, where citizenship has historically operated as a system of inequality, neoliberalism advances over social rights and reveals itself as authoritarian and oppressive towards "third-class citizens", to whom the "penal State" remains.

Keywords

Brazilian citizenship; Human rights; Incarceration; Neoliberalism; Social rights

Introduction

This research represents the result of studies conducted between the years of 2018 and 2020 on neoliberal economic policies, the neoliberal model of state and the neoliberal model of subjectivation. From these studies emerged the urge to understand more of the reality of neoliberalism in Brazil, specifically its implications on the guarantee of human rights and the construction of Brazilian citizenship. Given the breadth of this subject, it was chosen to link neoliberalism to the topic of social rights and incarceration in Brazil, motivated by the desire to investigate the recent takeover of the Brazilian public space by political discourses and practices that aim to diminish the social responsibilities of the State and reinforce punitivism.

Through bibliographic and documentary research on Brazilian legislation and public policy programs, this paper seeks to identify and analyze the impacts of the neoliberal model of State on human rights, particularly on social rights in Brazil between the years of 2016 and March 2022. It begins with a characterization of neoliberalism and the neoliberal model of state. Secondly, the paper has carried out a theoretical and documentary survey of human rights' international protection and the guarantee of social rights in Brazil. Afterwards, it has identified to what extent the implementation of a neoliberal model of state affects the realization and the foundation of human rights. Finally, it has analyzed how neoliberalism provokes the precarization of social rights and the strengthening of the "penal State"[1], followed by the understanding of this phenomenon in the Brazilian context.

Neoliberalism and the neoliberal State

Firstly, neoliberalism and the neoliberal model of State are briefly characterized. Overall, this paper conceives neoliberalism as the economic, ethical and political model of our times (Heinen 2020). That is: as an economic model, it encompasses the establishment of the "spontaneous order" of the free market through a primer of financialization, deregulation, fiscal adjustment, privatization, labor flexibility, and trade liberalization, among other measures. This order, in practice, is guaranteed by the State, responsible for preserving the institutional bases necessary for the market to function and for sustaining a favorable business climate by delegating political power to corporate interests. It can be said, then, that

[1] When analyzing the United States' public security policy, especially after the 1980s, Loïc Wacquant created the concept of "penal State" to denote the emergence of criminalization and "punitive containment" of marginalized people as a social policy intrinsic to neoliberalism, which progressively replaced the decaying welfare State, as further explained in section 5 (Wacquant 2003, 19-20).

the economic dynamics of neoliberalism favor the upper-income class and consider income concentration and social inequality "functional elements" (Harvey 2012).

Secondly, as an ethical model, neoliberalism is understood as a "way of life"; in other words, it is a rationality that expands the logic of the market - of cost-efficiency, competition, individualism - into the most diverse spheres of human action, for example, work, family, the state, and school (Dardot and Laval 2016). There are three aspects that characterize such neoliberal ethics. First, individual freedom, which is interpreted by neoliberal theorists as the possibility to choose without suffering direct coercion by another individual. Cultural, financial, social or political restrictions are not seen as obstacles to freedom, after all, for neo-liberal epistemology, there are no social structures, only "individual agents"[2] (Heinen 2020; Pinzani 2016, 369-82). Second, individual responsibility, a direct implication of this strictly technical conception of freedom: if the individual is free to choose, regardless of the social structure in which he or she is placed, the risks and consequences arising from this choice, whether success or failure, become his or her sole responsibility (Dardot and Laval 2016; Heinen 2020; Pinzani 2016, 369-82). Third, economic rationality, which guides the choice of individuals and social actors according to a calculation of costs and benefits. That is, the most advantageous and least costly means are sought to achieve the results intended by each action, in view of an efficient investment of resources (Dardot and Laval 2016; Heinen 2020).

Finally, as a political model, neoliberalism projects a reformed (and constantly being reformed) State to institute and defend the free market; the neoliberal State, it must be emphasized, is not a minimal State. This reform, then, aims at adapting the State to economic logic and making it a strategic instrument to promote the market. To this end, it is not enough to allocate part of the state power to private means, but, above all, to submit the State to the same competition and efficiency norms that govern capital. In other words, it is a matter of organizing the State along the lines of a company that, as such, operates by calculating costs and benefits and is guided by performance criteria (Dardot and Laval 2016; Davies 2018, 273-83; Wacquant 2012, 505 *et seq*).

In this regard, the legitimacy of the State is extracted from the achieved economic rationality, thus extirpating notions of "social justice" or political purposes, which subvert the "spontaneous order of the markets". In fact, the need to reform the state apparatus stems from neoliberalism's hostility to what is public and political; in William Davies' words, neoliberalism is the very "pursuit of the disenchantment of politics by economics" (Davies

[2] Margaret Thatcher's quote is well known: "there is no such thing as society, there are individual men and women and there are families".

2016, 4). Consequently, the political and public sense of state action - linked, in a democracy, to the guarantee of rights and the collective well-being - is replaced by the technical and privatistic logic of the economy, which takes the space previously occupied by politics as an instance of social regulation (Andrade 2019, 211 *et seq*; Davies 2018, 273-83).

Human rights and the international protection of social rights

To begin, it is important to clarify that, for the purposes of this paper, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is considered as the contemporary foundation of human rights, symbol of their internationalization and reconstruction in the post-war period (Bobbio 2004). The UDHR inaugurates what Norberto Bobbio (2004) calls the third and last phase in the course of rights declarations: the affirmation of rights becomes universal, in the sense that it is addressed to all human beings, and positive, in the sense that it is not enough to be proclaimed, but requires effective protection (Bobbio 2004; Piovesan 2013; Ramos 2018).

It is also necessary to point out that the paper has adopted a critical approach to the concept of human rights, as Joaquín Herrera Flores (2009) argues: this paper conceives them as the result of collective struggles directed toward the construction of material and immaterial conditions for a dignified life. Beyond a right to have rights, they are processes of struggle for dignity embedded in a field of social, economic, political, cultural, and ideological dispute - after all, human rights are not given, but constructed. In light of this, the struggle for human rights exists *because* a system of values and of an unequal division of labor is in place and *in order to* provide people with the tools to implement the life project that, in their view, is worth living (Flores 2009).

Without overlooking the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights' dimensions, but due to the breadth of the subject, as already mentioned, the present analysis is restricted to social rights. In the words of André Ramos (2018):

> social rights consist of a set of faculties and legal positions through which an individual may demand benefits from the State or from society, or even the abstention from acting, all to ensure minimum material and sociocultural conditions for survival. (Ramos 2018, 72)

As a complement, José Murilo de Carvalho (2008) affirms that social rights have as their purpose the guarantee of society's participation in the collective wealth, so as to allow the reduction of existing inequalities and the establishment of a minimum welfare for all. According to the author, the idea that underlies them is social justice.

In order to examine the normative protection of this category of rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is chosen as a

reference, since it is the main international regulation of the so-called "second dimension" of human rights. The treaty was signed in 1966 - simultaneously with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but in separate covenants, due to ideological disputes in the midst of the Cold War - with the purpose of conferring legally binding effect to the social rights listed in articles 22 to 28 of the UDHR, which, under a strictly legalistic viewpoint, consists of political declarations without normative application. Thus, the ICESCR incorporates and expands the rights set forth in the UDHR, including in its catalog of protection the right of peoples to self-determination, the right to work and to fair remuneration, the right to social security, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to health, the right to education, among others (Peres, Brilhante, Campo, Bruxelas, Mohallem and Reis 2016; Peterke 2010; Piovesan 2013).

One of the most important stipulations of the ICESCR is the progressive realization of social rights and the resulting prohibition of regression. In other words, the treaty conditions the realization of these rights to the actions of the States, which commit themselves to act to the maximum of their available resources, with the purpose of progressively guaranteeing the full exercise of the recognized rights. The ICESCR, therefore, addresses obligations to the States parties in the economic, social, and cultural fields, under a fundamental tripod: to respect, protect, and implement these rights (Peres *et al.* 2016; Piovesan 2013).

It is also important to mention, with regard to the so-called inter-American system of protection, the additional protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) entitled the "Protocol of San Salvador", which incorporates and broadens the catalog of rights recognized by the ICESCR. Finally, it is worth pointing out that, in Brazil, the 1988 Federal Constitution is the legal landmark of the institutionalization of human rights. The constitutional text establishes the dignity of the human person as the foundation of the Brazilian Republic and the prevalence of human rights as the guiding principle of its international relations (1988 Brazilian Constitution, art. 1º, inc III; 1988 Brazilian Constitution, art. 4º, inc. II). Above all, the introduction of these provisions was fundamental for the insertion of international instruments for the protection of human rights into our legal system: with respect to the treaties addressed, Brazil ratified the ICESCR and the ACHR in 1992, in addition to the Protocol of San Salvador in 1999, which came to complement, expand and strengthen the guarantee of the list of social, economic and cultural rights already recognized by the Constitution (Peterke 2010; Piovesan 2013; Ramos 2018).

Citizenship and social rights in Brazil

In Thomas Marshall's definition (1967, 76): "Citizenship is a status bestowed on all those who are full members of a community. All those who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed".

In this regard, it can be said that citizenship is the result of the struggle for equality, which brings together different subjects and rights according to each country and historical moment. From this definition, it should be noted that this struggle has developed within the State's geographical and political boundaries. Consequently, the process of citizenship construction coincides with that of the realization of human rights and, despite their internationalization, these rights are still materialized today, above all, through citizenship, in the sphere of the State (Marshall 1967).

Taking into account the mentioned historicity of citizenship, Marshall (1967) divided this concept into three elements, according to the development of rights in England from the 18th to the 20th centuries. First, the author distinguishes the civil element, formed by rights related to individual freedom; second, the political, composed of rights to participate in the exercise of political power; third, the social, concerning rights to a minimum core of welfare policies and participation in the social inheritance. This sequence, however, was not reproduced in Brazil: here, "the pyramid of rights was placed upside down", an inversion that characterizes the nature of our citizenship (Carvalho 2008, 220).

In Brazilian lands, social rights assume a prominent place. They were implemented and accentuated during periods of suppression of civil and political rights; first, during the Vargas dictatorship[3], then during the military dictatorship[4]. Thus, the State, specifically the Executive Branch, became the central figure in the institutionalization of social rights, detached from the participation of civil society. On the other hand, the Legislative Branch and its mechanisms of representation were devalued and a corporativist vision of collective interests, negotiated with the government for the benefit of specific categories, was favored

[3] Getúlio Vargas is a distinguished leader in Brazilian history, who ruled the country for almost twenty years: from 1930 to 1945 and from 1951 until 1954. In 1937, after a coup d'état, he imposed a dictatorship that lasted until 1945. Of personalist, nationalist, authoritarian and centralizing characteristics, the "Varguista" dictatorship implemented a nationalist project of modernization and industrialization of the country, and strengthened legislation and social policies for workers; for example, the minimum wage and the labor law code were established in this period (Bueno 2010, 345-354).

[4] From 1964 to 1985, Brazil was governed by a military dictatorship that restricted civil and political rights, censored the media, and persecuted opponents of the regime - more than 400 people died or disappeared, not to mention the practice of arbitrary imprisonment and torture. With a modernizing and nationalistic character, in the socio-economic field, the military regime prioritized the construction of projects in the transportation and energy sectors, and advanced in the development of a national social security unified and universalized system, besides instituting the first housing policies for home ownership (Bueno 2010, 376-401).

(Carvalho 2008). For José Murilo de Carvalho (2008), citizenship in Brazil is, in fact, a "stateship": it was not conquered by the population, but granted by the government. Consequently, apart from a public and democratic connotation, rights tend to be understood as mere personal benefits conferred by a public authority, and politics is often associated with the search for a messianic leadership to save the country from its woes (Carvalho 2008).

In view of this, one may conclude that the implementation of social rights in Brazil without the safeguarding of civil and political rights, and so detached from civil society itself, has led to an emptying of citizenship. In fact, the inversion of the pyramid of rights, added to the country's authoritarian, proslavery and patrimonialist heritage, turned Brazilian citizenship into a system of inequality - essentially contrary to the egalitarian aspirations of citizenship described by Marshall (1967) and to democracy - that segregates citizens into classes by income, color and education, according to Carvalho (2008).

First-class citizens are those "above the law", that is, the privileged elite that, through economic power and social prestige, access the political arena and defend their interests in order to have the law applied only for their benefit. In between are the "simple citizens", second class, who often have no knowledge of their rights, nor the means to access and enjoy them, so that they are "subject to the rigors and benefits of the law" (Carvalho 2008, 216), which is applied to them in a partial and uncertain manner. Finally, the third class citizens - the marginal population of big cities, street dwellers, housemaids, informal workers, in their overwhelming majority black or brown, poorly educated or illiterate -, whose rights are systematically violated by society and the government; "for them only the Penal Code is applied" (Carvalho 2008, 217).

Social rights in Brazil today

Notwithstanding the fact that the Brazilian "Citizen's Constitution"[5] established a profile of a State that promotes social justice, in the years that followed redemocratization, the implementation of social rights was marked by tensions between the paradigm of the neoliberal State and that of the welfare State. From 1990 on, driven by the global movement towards neoliberalism, the agenda of the "minimal welfare State", detached from universal social policies, took center stage. Only in the Workers' Party (PT) governments, especially after Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's second term, an unprecedented reconciliation of the economic and social fields has been sought, in order to build policies in which they dialogue and complement each other (Fagnani 2011; Passos and Guedes 2015).

[5] The 1998 Brazilian Constitution is commonly called the "Citizen's Constituion".

Before delving into the content and effects of these policies, it is necessary to stress that the PT governments did not confront the structural inequality of Brazilian society nor did they break with neoliberalism and the interests of the dominant classes. For example, the macroeconomic policy of the previous government was sustained, based on the neoliberal tripod of exchange-rate, inflation and surplus; institutions and policies of income concentration were preserved, such as the regressive taxation of income and wealth; incarceration was widely used to combat criminality, penalizing the poor and black population (Fagnani 2011; Passos and Guedes 2015).

Despite this, new and important steps were taken in the construction of a true citizenship. In terms of social rights, it is worth highlighting the areas of education, health and social assistance, which followed a trajectory of increased public spending (dating back to the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso), the opening of spaces for pressure and control by civil society, and the implementation of social policies. Some of these are: the Bolsa Família Program (PBF)[6]; the Universidade para Todos Program (Prouni)[7]; the Student Financing Fund (Fies)[8]; the Minha Casa, Minha Vida Program[9]; the Basic Education Maintenance and Development Fund (Fundeb)[10]; the consolidation of a policy of social and ethno-racial quotas in federal institutions of higher education; the real increase of the minimum wage (Fagnani 2011; Passos and Guedes 2015).

In spite of these advances, the trajectory of social gains was reversed in losses after the economic recession that began in 2015, when the "minimal social State" agenda regained prominence and boosted the march of fiscal austerity, liberalizing reforms, and dismantling of social policies, under a repertoire of criticism toward the patrimonialist, corrupt, corporativist, and inefficient State. Currently, in flagrant disrespect to the international commitments signed by Brazil, the social regression is worsening under the neoliberal and neoconservative government of Jair Bolsonaro. This recent inflection in social policies is

[6] "Bolsa Família" is the largest and main cash transfer program in Brazil. It aims to guarantee basic income for families living in poverty and strengthen their access to basic rights such as health and education (Ministério do Desenvolvimento e Assistência Social Família e Combate à Fome 2023).

[7] The Universidade para Todos (University for All) Program grants full and partial scholarships for undergraduate courses at private universities (Ministério da Educação 2023c).

[8] The Student Financeing Fund is intended to finance the undergraduate studies of those enrolled in private universities (Ministério da Educação 2023a).

[9] The "Minha Casa, Minha Vida" (My House, My Life) Program fully or partially finances the purchase of a home for low-income families (Ministério das Cidades 2023).

[10] "Fundeb" distributes financial resources to all levels of Brazilian public basic education (Ministério da Educação 2023b).

evidenced by the 2021 report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which shows "concern with the recent processes of threatening and destructuring of institutions and policies built over more than two decades," especially with regard to social rights (CIDH 2021, 189).

With this in mind, this paper will address some of the main measures that impact the consolidation of social rights and deepen the abyss that separates the classes of citizens. Initially, it is important to highlight the Constitutional Amendment no. 95/2016, which instituted a new fiscal regime lasting 20 years, starting in 2016. This policy establishes the limitation of the federal government's primary expenses to a ceiling defined by the maximum value of the immediately preceding year, corrected by accumulated inflation. In other terms, the new regime freezes the real amount of public spending until 2036. Thus, ongoing social policies are suffocated and the redistribution of public spending is compressed (Brasil 2016; Arantes, Dweck, Oliveira and Rossi 2019; Pellanda and Pipinis 2021).

Second, Law no. 13.467/2017 (Labor Reform) - which, in a general overview, makes labor relations more unequal and dismantles rights - broadens the employer's discretion over individual and collective contracts, weakens the bargaining power of workers and reduces the normative power of the Labor Court. In this respect, some points of the referred Law are critical, for example, the prevalence of negotiated over legislated in the cases of the article 611-A; the legalization of the 12-36 workday for any employer; the compensation for rest breaks; the creation of intermittent work; the prohibition to classify autonomous workers as employees even in the case of a continuous and exclusive relationship; the permission for collective dismissal without an agreement with unions; the equalization of the hyper-sufficient worker with a collective contract and the possibility of outsourcing so-called end-activities (Brasil 2017; Carvalho 2017, 81 *et seq.*).

Moreover, it is important to mention the Constitutional Amendment no. 32/20 (Administrative Reform), which seeks to change the organization of the Public Administration and the legal systems of its employees. With the purpose of conferring greater flexibility, efficiency and fiscal responsibility to public management, the project makes government service more precarious and threatens the guarantee and quality of public services and social policies. Among its most problematic proposals are the loss of stability for public servants; the institutionalization of five new employment relationships with the government; the increase in contracting temporary workers; the inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the Federal Constitution, making the government subsidiary to the private

sector; and the granting of carte blanche to the President of the Republic to promote structural changes in the Administration (Brasil 2020; Pellanda and Pipinis 2021).

Finally, the dismantling promoted since 2016 in social public policies must be highlighted. As an example, the Bolsa Família Program (BFP) has accumulated 2.3 million Brazilians enrolled in the "CadÚnico" [11] waiting list and about 1.1 million families disconnected from the program between May 2019 and January 2020. As if this were not enough, the amounts distributed by PBF have suffered real losses since the end of 2014, and, in 2021, the program will be replaced by the Auxílio Brasil program. As for education, in the period between 2016 and 2019, the federal government's discretionary expenses with the respective Ministry were reduced by 17%. Consequently, the budget of federal universities declined from 10.4 billion reais in 2014 (inflation-adjusted) to 4.3 billion reais, despite the increase of more than 150,000 students and six new universities (FGV 2020; Redação Brasil de Fato 2021).

Neoliberalism and human rights

Since human rights are inseparable from the rights of citizenship, guaranteed and realized at the national level, it is necessary to address the disintegrating effect of the neoliberal globalization of markets on the legal-political framework of the State, whose centrality and exclusivity are widely challenged by the former. Indeed, state sovereignty as a supreme power that recognizes no other above itself is challenged on several fronts (Faria 1997).

Among them, I draw attention to the extraordinary power that economic globalization confers on transnational conglomerates to negotiate with the State and demand the fulfillment of their interests. In the words of José Eduardo Faria (1997, 47), the restriction of state sovereignty becomes particularly evident "when [the State] is constrained to negotiate with economic forces that transcend the national level, conditioning its investments to the acceptance of their values [...] and their particular mechanisms of conflict resolution."

Such forms of economic power compel legislative policy, legal rules, and state institutions to deregulation and delegalization, which more precisely mean re-regulation and relegalization at the level of private organizations - positive state law is either internationalized in the supra-state sphere or replaced by private norms in the infra-state sphere. Ultimately, private power intermingles with public power, and politics is replaced by

[11] "CadÚnico", or Single Registry for Social Programs, is a system created and used by the Brazilian government to collect information and identify low-income families in order to include them in income redistribution and social assistance programs (Caixa Econômica Federal 2023).

the market as the instance of social regulation "[as] decision making has become transnationalized, political decisions have become increasingly conditioned by macroeconomic balances that have come to represent an effective normative principle responsible for establishing certain limits to the regulatory and disciplinary interventions of governments" (Faria 1997, 43-44).

In this regard, beyond the rupture in the centrality of state institutions, the hegemony of markets affects the foundation and purpose of the State. As already emphasized in section one, neoliberalism restructures the state framework along the lines of the market system and in order to promote the latter, so that state action itself is submitted to the norms of efficiency, supply and demand. Neoliberalism imposes technical performance criteria on state activity and orients it toward the achievement of results; in other words, state activity is governed and based on the economic rationality of costs and benefits.

The State, thereby committed to technique and efficiency, resembles a service providing company - only private interests have substance and, as a consequence, the public sphere is confused with the private one, and all sorts of rights and social relations are mediated by the price system. Public service, whose intrinsic purpose is the protection and implementation of rights, is submitted to the sieve of neoliberal accounting (Brown 2019; Dardot and Laval 2016; Davies 2018; Pinzani 2016).

By this logic, neoliberalism elects the market as the mechanism for allocating social resources, at the expense of social rights or public services. Political intentions or ideals of social justice, equality or collective responsibility are extirpated from state activity; for neoliberal theorists, these principles are an attack against individual freedom and an artificial deviation in the "spontaneous order" of the market and, therefore, are "essentially subversive doctrines", in the words of Milton Friedmam (Nunes 2003, 50), that pave the "road to serfdom" (expression after Friedrich Hayek's most well-known book) (Faria 1997; Nunes 2003).

As a matter of fact, the neoliberal notion of freedom does not even comprise the public sphere; as already pointed out, it is independent of the social structure in which the subject is immersed. Freedom is conceived in its market model, and only the "spontaneous order" of the market would guarantee a free society and, at the same time, "the greatest possible degree of equality" (Nunes 2008, 48). This is because, for neoliberals, a society that prioritizes equality falls into forms of totalitarianism and fails to achieve both freedom and equality; on the other hand, if it prioritizes freedom, it has more freedom and more equality. In this view, the goals of equality or social security should and are better ensured if placed

under the responsibility of each individual or family - "self-insurers" - rather than in the hands of the State (Brown 2019; Nunes 2003).

The conception of citizenship is then deeply jeopardized by such hostility to the public and the political. The neoliberal citizen is actually closer to the figure of a customer or consumer, since he is conceived solely from the perspective of his individual interests, "as a buyer of services who should get what he pays for" (Dardot and Laval 2016, 208). And nothing more: this citizen-customer is urged to take self-responsibility for providing for his needs and improving his financial and social condition; he is "free" to build his individual prosperity. In short, citizens are "encouraged to see themselves as isolated individuals [...], not as rights-holders requiring policies of inclusion" (Pinzani 2016, 382).

Therefore, the neoliberal model of State, based on competition, efficiency and ultra-individualism, and oriented towards the promotion of the market, proves to be incompatible with the concrete meaning of human rights - to ensure material and immaterial conditions for a life that is worth living - and the principles that underlie them - social justice and substantive equality. Moreover, the very implementation of human rights, since it gravitates around state instances, is hindered by economic transnationalization, which undermines public powers, and by the State's distancing from its public purpose and from the guarantee of social rights (Faria 1997).

Furthermore, neoliberalism threatens human rights that survive (on paper) the processes of deregulation and delegalization: it subverts them and manipulates their universal character in order to promote the hegemony of markets; in the words of Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1997), it places them as a functional part of a "hegemonic globalization", designed "from top to bottom"[12]. Human rights are enclosed in an iron cage of formalisms that separates them from their content and real implementation, and legitimizes injustices - freedom and equality, if interpreted technically, negatively, and economically, serve the expansion of the neoliberal system (Douzinas 2008; Faria 1997; Flores 2009).

In doing so, neoliberalism "desacralizes" human rights, which are applied selectively, according to negotiations between decision-makers and recipients; they become market options. As a consequence, the protection of the dignity of those who live at the margins of markets and society is destabilized, and they lose the conditions to demand the fulfillment of their rights. In the neoliberal perspective, they do not even appear as right holders (Faria 1997; Flores 2009). Due to this scenario, truly emancipatory human rights can be understood

[12] Specifically, it is a "globalized localism," that is, when a local phenomenon extends its influence across the globe and shapes other local conditions (Santos 1997).

as the very result "of the processes of antagonistic struggle that take place against the material expansion and ideological generalization of the system of relations imposed by the processes of capital accumulation" (Flores 2009, 109).

Neoliberalism, social rights and incarceration

As already mentioned, neoliberalism is constituted by processes of exclusion: under the rhetoric of individual responsibility and freedom, combined with the reduction of the so-called fiscal burden of poverty, the discriminated and marginalized masses of society and market are excluded from the status of citizenship. As a result, inequalities are intensified, the exercise of citizenship is degraded, and social insecurity - in terms of unemployment, retirement, food, disease, housing, and education - is amplified.

On the grounds of that, in order to control the turbulence generated by such instability and to guarantee the sense of security of the privileged classes, the State spreads its penal apparatus over the marginalized populations, in a sort of "management of the undesirables". In other words, the rise of objective and subjective insecurity generated by a "minimal social State" is remediated by a "maximum penal State", that is, the deficits of social and citizenship rights are largely compensated by excesses in criminalization and the multiplication of incarceration - the neoliberal minimal State is nothing but a fallacy (Andrade 2006; Wacquant 2003).

This characterizes the passage from a "welfare State" to a "penal State" that no longer combats exclusion, but rather combats, through criminalization, the excluded themselves, "scapegoats for the country's greatest evils" (Wacquant 2003, 24). In the terms of Loïc Wacquant (2003), the neoliberal State is structured on the transfer of resources and programs, in the lower regions of the socioeconomic space, from a welfare logic to a disciplinary and punitive logic. Therefore, for the author, this State has the features of a centaur: it presents a diligent and liberalizing face to the upper classes, favoring them politically and economically; but it shows itself penalizing, restrictive, and authoritarian to the lower classes (Wacquant 2012).

According to Wacquant (2011), this neoliberal movement toward penalization has two components. The first is the "transformation of social services into instruments of surveillance and control" of dangerous populations ("workfare"), who are called upon to take responsibility for themselves. The State establishes a contractual relationship with citizen-consumers, so that access to the social services offered is conditioned to the fulfillment of rules of conduct (regarding education, sexuality, and drug use, for example) and of certain obligations, which usually aim at entering the precarious and flexible labor market. Among

the most common of these is the requirement of a labor consideration, that is, the beneficiary is forced to accept any job that is offered to him, regardless of remuneration or working conditions. Rights, thus, lose their unavailability and are reduced to mere conditional benefits (Waquant 2003; 2011).

The second component of the control of the marginalized is "the massive and systematic recourse to incarceration". Far from an ideal of rehabilitation and resocialization of criminals, the goal of neoliberal punishment is selective and authoritarian: to maintain "public order" by controlling the marginalized population, isolating it from society and stockpiling it in prisons. In other terms, punishment becomes "an instrument of closure of a population considered deviant and dangerous as well as superfluous, in the economic sphere" (Pastana 2007, 210). Additionally, it must be emphasized that greater incarceration is not related to an increase in criminal practices, but to the curbing of social instability caused by the decline of social policies and the deepening of inequalities (Wacquant 2001; 2003).

The punitive rise is, then, presented as a solution to social conflicts, so that, articulated with authoritarian and repressive neoconservatism, it draws legitimacy from its symbolic performance as a reassuring mechanism of public opinion. This is because it shows tangible results (increased imprisonment), its costs are hardly submitted to public debate, and, above all, it is vested with a positive moral charge, based on the freedom and security of the privileged class and on the individual responsibility of the marginalized people for their condition; after all, crime is understood as a personal choice. Inflated by neoconservative slogans - "zero tolerance" and "a good criminal is a dead criminal", of Brazilian creation - and by the media spectacularization, a "state of emergency" is spread and a frightened social imaginary dominated by criminality - "this 'enemy' scenically greater than all others" - is built (Andrade 2006).

In this regard, responses to criminality, in their majority, consist of greater repression - incrimination of new conducts and more severe treatment to the offender - of minor offenses (street delinquency) and fall heavily on the racially discriminated and economically marginalized population. In short, a vicious circle is created between the production of social vulnerability and the radicalization of punishment, which tends to become its own justification. The penal State, therefore, ignores the real causes of social insecurity and actively contributes to the construction of an exclusive citizenship, by perpetuating social asymmetries necessary for the maintenance of neoliberalism (Pastana 2007; Wacquant 2001).

The "penal State" in Brazil today

The punitive penal policy as a component of neoliberalism, on which this paper has focused so far, was generated in the North-American context and successfully globalized, being imported by peripheral countries such as Brazil (Leal and Pessoa 2019). Since Brazilian re-democratization, the authoritarian and racist political-institutional heritage, which dates back to colonial times, has been preserved; the repression of street delinquency has been strengthened, especially drug trafficking (Law no. 11.343/06); the rates of police lethality have grown, concentrated in the actions of military police officers; and the number of the prison population has progressively increased - between 2000 and 2020, the percentage of people in Brazilian prison system grew by an astonishing 330.9% (FBSP 2021; Leal and Pessoa 2019).

On the other hand, Brazilians have witnessed efforts to change the authoritarian approach to crime and implement citizen security policies, such as increasing civil society participation in the governance of public security. Nevertheless, as of 2018, the "penal State" is vigorously reinforced, in contrast to the minimization of the "social State": while social rights are preempted and dismantled on a large scale, the punitive agenda to fight crime becomes central (CIDH 2021).

In terms of public security policies, it is necessary to mention the promotion of militarization, materialized in measures such as the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro and the granting of pardon to police officers who committed crimes with "excesso culposo". Also noteworthy are the alarming proportions of deaths caused by police action - 6,416 deaths in 2020, 78.9% of which were of black people. Moreover, there has been a "depublicization" of security caused by the relaxation of access to firearms, which has caused gun ownership to grow by 100.6% since 2017 (FBSP 2021). This process was carried out by 31 regulatory changes made by the Bolsonaro government, which, in general, increase the limit of weapons that can be purchased by ordinary citizens and reduce the control of the Army and civil authorities on weapons (Resende 2021).

Regarding the legal-legislative plan, it is necessary to highlight Law no. 13.964/19, the "Anti-crime Package", in which provisions that aim to increase punishment and incarceration predominate. To illustrate, the most controversial ones are: the increase in the maximum time for serving custodial sentences to 40 years; the expansion of the hypotheses of "legitimate defense" of security agents; new levels of sentence completion required for regime progression, which can reach 70%; the broadening of the list of "heinous crimes", which now includes the hypothesis of aggravated robbery. In judicial practice, it is also worth

mentioning the relaxation of the constitutional guarantee of legality through the use of open rules (or even the invention of legal principles, such as the so-called *in dubio pro societate*) and the inversion of the burden of proof in criminal proceedings (Brasil 2019; Rosa and Muniz 2020).

Finally, one cannot ignore the emergence of public authorities that have elevated a truculent punitivist rhetoric to the symbolic reference of the exercise of State authority, in order to endorse oppressive uses of the government apparatus. Perhaps the biggest reference is President Jair Bolsonaro himself, who has the recipe for confronting criminality up his sleeve: "[...] with strict laws, filling the jail with bums" (Jovem Pan 2016). To Bolsonarism, the notion of human rights is devalued as a victimization, while the "bums" are indelibly marked as an enemy, whose life is detached from the rights of citizenship, under the urgency of preserving freedom, order, and social security. Ultimately, inequality is trivialized and the authoritarianism and racism structural to the exercise of power in Brazil is radicalized.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that, as a political model, neoliberalism is characterized as a project that involves constant reforms to the State in order to adapt it to an economicist logic and to turn it into a strategic instrument for the market. The State, within the framework of "hegemonic globalization", is guided by criteria of efficiency, and its actions are subordinated to the interests of transnational economic forces. Consequently, the political and public purpose of State activity is taken over by the privatist grammar of the economy, which assumes the power and space previously occupied by politics as an instance of social regulation.

Such predominance of the market and hostility to the political sphere collide with the emancipatory character and with fundamental values of citizenship and human rights - in fact, neoliberalism, ultra-individualistic by birth, does not even encompass the notion of society. On the one hand, human rights lose their substance and are enclosed in a formalistic and abstract rationality that submits itself to the sieve of efficiency. On the other hand, the State withdraws from the protection and implementation of social rights, which represent a threat to the spontaneous order of the markets, and leaves the responsibility for one's life and socioeconomic situation to the individual.

As discussed above, the neoliberal State transfers resources and programs from a welfare logic to a disciplinary and punitive one, which focuses on controlling the social instability resulting from the abandonment of the State's social obligations and the intensification of inequality. In "workfare," penal discipline colonizes social services;

meanwhile "prisonfare" strengthens the penal apparatus and increases incarceration. These approaches, however, fail to remedy the structural cause of social insecurity; on the contrary, they reinforce it and preserve the inequalities arising from and essential to the neoliberal system.

In Brazil, this movement toward minimizing the "social State" and maximizing the "penal State" is evident. On the one hand, the redistribution of public spending is compressed and social rights are dismantled through legal reforms, in addition to the erosion of public policies in the social sectors. On the other hand, the agenda of combating crime assumes centrality: constitutional criminal guarantees are relaxed, the militarization of security policies is reinforced, access to firearms is facilitated, incarceration is increased, and a punitive rhetoric is preached. Thus, the inequalities that structure Brazilian citizenship, which is divided by income and color, are deepened.

Finally, neoliberal State policies abandon, discipline, and punish the discriminated and marginalized population: black and poor people. "Third-class citizens" lose the concrete conditions to exercise, protect and demand access to material and immaterial goods necessary for their existence, their development and their freedom - "they no longer appear as bearers of subjective public rights" (Faria 1997, 50). Neoliberalism proves to be essentially authoritarian and anti-democratic, therefore incompatible with the foundation and attainment of human rights.

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Moving feminisms: Mapping the circulation of feminist thought between Brazil and France

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Abstract

This work is the result of a mapping of the circulation of feminist thought in Brazil and France from the 1970s until the 2010s. It seeks to understand under which conditions there were exchanges between Brazilian and French feminist knowledge and what are the new challenges in establishing international research networks. The methodological strategy consists of the application of semi-structured interviews with Brazilian and French researchers and a content analysis of academic journals on Political Science, Gender, and Feminism in both countries. The results point to a process of enlargement and diversification of this research field through new scientific and epistemological approaches. Theoretical diversity from the Global South becomes increasingly necessary to be included in social and political analysis concerning gender and feminism.

Keywords

Circulation of thought; Brazil; Feminist theory; France; Gender; Global South

Introduction

This paper is the partial result of a broader work focused on mapping the circulation of feminist thought between Brazil and France (Schuck 2017). It seeks to understand under what conditions there were exchanges between Brazilian and French feminisms. I intend to identify the historical, political, and institutional conditions that led to feminist theoretical interactions between Brazil and France in two periods: 1974-1985 and 2000-2016. The research problem presented involves both institutional and political conditions that led to theoretical convergence between Brazilian and French feminisms. I intend to identify what challenges efforts to circulate feminist theories and to establish their space in the Brazilian research field of social sciences.

The hypothesis formulated for this research determined two periods of great theoretical convergence and ideological and intellectual affinities between Brazilian and French feminisms. The first period was 1974-1985, when feminist academic debates were observed in a theoretical flow from France to Brazil. The second period, 2000-2016, encompasses multidimensional information circulation, the global reconfiguration of knowledge and power relations, and the establishment of new epistemological paradigms — how French feminism more often seeks theoretical support in Global South feminisms, especially in Latin America and Brazil.

The general objective of this research was to develop a mapping of the circulation of feminist thought in the Brazil-France axis and the space occupied within the current configuration of the academic research field. The specific objectives sought to point out the theoretical exchanges between the feminisms of the two countries in the constitution of the mentioned academic spaces and other intellectual contributions in the formation of Brazilian research centers; to delimit the use of French bibliographic references in Brazilian feminist academia; to identify the publication of French authors in Brazil; and to also identify the publication of Brazilian authors in France.

The emphasis on the contribution of French feminist thought is not fortuitous. The French contribution is central to the trajectory of world feminism, as we can mention Olympe de Gouges' "*Declaration of the Rights of Women and Citizens*" in 1791, the international repercussions of Simone de Beauvoir's "Second Sex" in 1949, and the historical performance of *Mouvement Libération des Femmes (MLF)* since 1970. In addition, there is a historical link between Brazilian feminists and French feminism. During the Brazilian military dictatorship from 1964-1985, France welcomed politically exiled Brazilian women; many of these exiles participated in French feminist discussion groups and later promoted the creation of new

articulations focused on the political participation of women. This was the case of the Grupo Latino-americano de Mujeres en Paris and its magazine *Nosotras*[1], released by Brazilian and other Latin American women in 1974, as well as the Círculo Brasileira de Mulheres em Paris, a political organization founded in France in 1975.

This work is justified by the need to map the accumulation of symbolic and scientific capital present in the exchanges between French and Brazilian feminisms from a critical epistemological point of view. The global hegemonic context of Western thought in which the production, publication, distribution, and consumption of ideas and information have undeniable political effects and its implications must be considered beyond immediate feminism or a specific readership. As pointed out by (Mohanty 1988, 62) critical analysis must be attentive to "discursive colonialisms". If the dominant representation of a Western feminist is still valid, I reiterate one situated and critical position: female and Latin American researchers who make scientific research on the circulation of feminist thinking between the Global South and Global North.

Feminist thought and knowledge

Given the centrality of feminist thought in this paper, I will present some previous discussion on this topic. I approached the feminist theoretical contributions and its independence from other schools of political thought, which reverberates in the existence of a specific feminist epistemology. I sought to bring together elements that characterize the feminist scientific field in order to allow the analysis of the international flows of feminist knowledge.

Feminist thought is the result of previous social and political reflections on the inequality between men and women that exists in most societies (Alcoff and Potter 1993). It derives from the refusal to assert that such inequality would be merely a reflection of the differentiated nature of the two genders, which are necessary for the survival of the human species. The refusal of the thesis of sexual difference implies the development of a broad critique of the social world. Such criticism points to asymmetry reproduction, which hinders the agency of many members of the social world and reinforces the many ways in which women are oppressed (Miguel and Biroli 2014).

Although with limited space in the debates on politics and democracy, "feminism is probably one of the intellectual currents of modernity and political philosophy that most provoked social changes in denouncing inequalities, oppression and the mechanisms of male

[1] See the cover and back-cover of one of its editions at appendix 1.

domination" (Valcarcel 2012, 15). As forms of domination became more complex and demanded more sophisticated tools to understand them, feminist thought turned into a field of knowledge composed of theories capable of assisting in the understanding of the reproduction of gender inequalities (Mackenzie 2011; Miguel and Biroli 2014).

I understand that feminist thought should be put in the plural, due to the multiple ways in which the associated critical concepts can be addressed. These associations may follow the guidelines of egalitarian feminism (with strands in a conceptual dispute over liberal and Marxist precepts) or may follow the tenets proposed by feminism of difference, whose aspects are close to post-structuralists and postmodernists — who are influenced by intellectuals such as Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan.

In addition, the dynamization of the global flows of thought allows a greater interface and dialogue between the feminist approaches from the Global North and the Global South. The approaches of indigenous, Islamic, black, postcolonial, decolonial, queer, or trans-feminism — because they deal with groups of people on the fringes within feminism itself — point to the need to rethink the polarization between the feminism of equality and the feminism of difference in an intercultural world intersected by multiple oppressions of gender, class, geopolitics, race, culture, religion, and sexuality.

The idea that there is an autonomous feminist political theory independent of other schools of political thought is the basis of this article. (Rago 1998) emphasized the need to deepen the Brazilian debate about the pertinence of a feminist theory of knowledge. Other Brazilian authors have also directly and indirectly promoted Rago's emphasis. There is an effort to demonstrate how the feminist view helps transform social sciences by employing not only a different conceptual framework, but also through rediscovering research themes and methodologies in order to reduce the instrumental character of a scientific conception created in a positivist cradle. Highlighting the field of political science, Biroli and Miguel (2014) also value the feminist contribution in the analysis of the dominating power relations in society.

First, feminist critiques have developed through contextual questions such as discrimination against women in science, the male hierarchy prevailing in the main academic spaces of different fields, the use of technology to reinforce women's social subjection, and so on. However, these themes soon advanced into questions about the foundations of contemporary Western thought — that is, they judged not only the conclusions presented by modern science, but also its procedures and foundations (Harding 1998).

Virginia Olesen (2010) similarly stresses that since the late 1960s feminist research has become more complex. If, in the first phase, criticisms about the gender character of academic disciplines, scientific institutions, and even the lack of attention of science in the face of discrimination against women were abundant, then in the second phase the focus was on the need to develop a critical epistemology. The debate that appreciated the recognition of differences among researchers led to the questioning of the idea of women as a universal subject as well as questioning the characteristics of researchers and their working conditions.

The debate on feminist epistemology has encouraged the emergence of a set of approaches that posit an emancipatory and transformative vision of feminism using the concepts of gender, race, ethnicity, and class. Several authors, combining all these dimensions, contribute to the understanding of the contributing factors to the oppression and vulnerability of women worldwide (Young 1990; Femenias 2007). Such conditions are identified from the critical thinking that points out the causes of discrimination against women — the conception of the androcentric world (Fraser 1995), which is the authoritarian construction of social, political, and economic norms that favor patterns associated with masculinity.

Feminist Theory and Research in Brazil

The academic publications of Brazilian women's studies started in the 1960s. Many Brazilian researchers have studied the intellectual pathways of feminism in their country, including Eva Blay, Rita Cardoso, Mariza Corrêa, Albertina de Oliveira Costa, Anette Goldberg, Miriam Grossi, Elisabeth Lobo, Sonia Miguel, Rose Marie Muraro, Eleonora Menicucci de Oliveira, Jacqueline Pitanguy, Celi Pinto, Jussara Prá, Heleieth Saffioti, Cynthia Sarti, and Fany Tabak. These are just a few of the researchers who contributed to the field of women's studies in Brazil.

The history of feminist research in Brazil officially started with Heleieth Saffioti's 1967 thesis *The Woman in Class Society: Myth and Reality*. Florestan Fernandes supervised Saffioti's thesis. In the years that followed, more female researchers studied women's issues in their masters' dissertations and/or doctoral theses — predominantly in the Sociology of Education and the Sociology of Labor (Goldberg 1989).

Due to the military dictatorship, feminism in Brazil had a special path of development. It was marked by the class struggle and the struggle against the dictatorship, as demonstrated in *Nós Mulheres* — one of the first feminist newspapers in Brazil that started in the 1970s (Grossi 2004). Most of the feminists were from the upper social classes and highly educated, which enriched their research abilities, according to Grossi.

At the end of the 1970s, the participatory euphoria of the leftist militancy was also visible in Brazilian universities. Most professors were young with leftist philosophers who were involved in illegal political parties or student movements in the 1960s; some university faculty members had once been imprisoned or exiled due to their commitment with democracy and social movement (Correa 2001).

Thus, the Brazilian feminist field of research arose amidst political repression, bringing with it the character of struggle for democratic spaces in academia and the wider society. It took about 20 years (1970-1990) of research work and international exchanges to establish a solid field of feminist and gender studies. This path was permeated with individual and institutional challenges, as reported by feminist researchers. The challenges in establishing this field included the constant need to respond to arguments that attempted to de-legitimize the validity of such studies. "Academic feminism has been expanding ever since, witnessed not only in the proliferation of women's and gender studies groups, primarily in public universities throughout the country" (Costa and Sardenberg 2014, 59).

During the 1980s, foreign organizations such as the *Ford Foundation* became the main source of financial support for research on women (Correa 2001; Prá 2016). In the same period, women's studies research centers began to be established at Brazilian universities (Grossi 2004). The 1990s sparked the launch of *Cadernos Pagu* and *Revista de Estudos Feministas (REF)*, which were two of the first academic journals dedicated to feminist studies (Grossi 2004).

Also in the 1990s, the dissemination of the use of gender as a valid concept became more widespread. According to Scavone (2007) and new centers of study used the term "gender" rather than the "women's studies" terminology of the previous decade. From the 1990s to the 2000s, gender studies more often merged with the general social sciences in Brazil. Also, more postgraduate courses on this domain were created (Costa and Sardenberg 2014; Grossi 2004; Scavone 2007).

Prá (2016b) highlights that the theoretical feminist debate was welcomed by different academic areas (i.e. anthropology, history, sociology, and population studies) and their respective professional associations. Internationally, there were already traditional and legitimized spaces such as the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) and the Latin American Political Science Association (ALACIP). As recalled by Jussara Prá (2016a), the International Congress *Fazendo Gênero*, organized by the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), referred to the creation of a specific space for this debate in Brazil. In its 11th rendition in 2017, the World Congress' '13th Worlds of Women & 11 th *Fazendo Gênero* -

Transformations, Connections, Dislocations' ' stood out for the wide academic scope of its activities (Veiga et al. 2019).

Feminist Theory and Research in France

The insertion of French feminism in the university was characterized by intense debate and divergences over the validity of bringing feminist discussion to the academic space (Bard 2003). The international projection of French feminism was led by the insurgency of the Women's Liberation Movement (MLF) in the 1970s. This movement made possible the expansion of feminism both in the field of social movements and in the field of scientific research in France (Lagrave 1990). The existence of a French tradition can be framed by different theoretical tenets, such as egalitarian feminism, feminism of difference, as well as the controversial *French feminism* (Cavallaro 2003; Delphy 2000).

The development of feminist thought and research on women in France derives from the political context of May 1968. The feminist rise is directly related to the emergency of the *MLF* and critical outstanding debates raised by this social movement: the radical critique of patriarchy, the denunciation of the oppression of women in both public and private spaces, and the emergence of questions about personal and political relations between the sexes — such as motherhood and sexuality as free choices; access to contraception; abortion rights; violence; and domestic work (Delphy 2001; Rouch 2001).

Thanks to the development of feminist studies in France, we can highlight the theoretical and ideological differences between the feminisms of equality and difference as well as the most recent discussions regarding topics related to parity, diversity, sexuality, and race (Sénac 2015). Investigating the scope of feminist discussions in France reveals, in any case, the transformative role of feminism. Although it lacks organizational strength and it can be difficult to transmit the proper information to the new generation to the young women who say "I am not a feminist, but ..." (Galster 2003, 514), feminism in France is still a latent force that can help transform French society.

Theoretical framework and conceptualization

In order to gather theoretical and methodological support for mapping the circulation of feminist knowledge between Brazil and France, I present the theoretical debate around the concepts related to the international movement of ideas. I introduce Edward Said's concept of *travelling theories* (1983*)*, combining it with other feminist approaches to the circulation of knowledge and translational politics (Appadurai 2007; Möser 2013; Varikas 2012) — this reinforces the theoretical and epistemological choice of the circulation of thought to the detriment of the consideration of unidirectional flows of knowledge.

Edward Said (1983, 226) argues that "ideas and theories travel from person to person, from situation to situation, from one time to another". The movement of ideas between different cultures, such as the ideas of transcendence of the East that were brought to Europe in the early 19th century, is never unimpeded. The author identifies a specific pattern in this particular movement and suggests four common stages for the traveling of any theory or idea: "(1) the emergence of the idea; 2) (the) creation of temporal or spatial passage for the idea; 3) (the) establishment of conditions of acceptance of the idea; and 4) (the) adaptation of the idea to the new context" (Said 1983, 228).

Cornelia Möser (2013) adapts such stages of movement to the understanding of feminist theoretical traveling. The author proposes to analyze the transit of feminist ideas through the processes of reception, translation, diffusion, and reappropriation. She also suggests that "an interdisciplinary and transnational perspective should be adopted" (Möser 2013, 364), revisiting feminist problems in terms of interaction, transfers, and traveling ideas rather than using the classical method of studying two countries separately.

To think about the circulation of feminist knowledge between Brazil and France, we present Appadurai's (2007) approach on global circulation of forms. According to the author, the moment of current globalization can be characterized as having high connectivity in the new levels, formats, and types of circulation — all of which are observable in "bodies, commodities, and ideas" (Appadurai 2007, 7). Thus, the conditions for the circulation of feminist knowledge are: feminist researchers (bodies); publishing, translating, and organizing conferences (commodities); and dealing with feminist knowledge (ideas). Thus, our analytical proposal is that the mapping of the circulation of feminist thought requires the distinction of three agents: 1) feminist researchers; 2) scientific production on gender, women, and feminism; and 3) feminist theories.

Methodology

Our methodology is guided by feminist epistemological approaches, which suited the purpose of mapping the international paths of feminist thought in the Brazil-France axis. The strategy adopted for the empirical study consisted of interviews as well as reviewing relevant academic journals published from 1974-2016. Thus, the methodological steps are the application of semi-structured interviews and content analysis. Through the analysis of the interviews of Brazilian and French feminist researchers and the comparative content analysis of academic journals on the political science, gender, and feminism of both countries, I identified unusual paths and challenges to the diffusion of feminist thought in the scientific and social research scope.

To verify the formulated hypothesis — that is, the conditions that produced the two moments of convergence — I relied on semi-directive interviews with Brazilian and French researchers as well as on the comparative content analysis of Brazilian and French academic journals. Regarding the interviews, the objective was to cross-reference the responses of French and Brazilian researchers in order to map the intellectual, institutional, and academic conditions necessary for the international circulation of feminist thought. For the analysis of the journals, the chosen methodology was the content analysis of the revision of the feminist literature of the two countries. I selected three journals dealing with gender and feminism and one political science journal for each country analyzed. Thus, I analyzed the Brazilian journals *Revista de Estudos Feministas* (REF), *Cadernos Pagu*, *Labrys*, and the *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política* (RBCP). For France, I selected *Questions Féministes/Nouvelles Questions Féministes* (NQF), *Cahiers du CEDREF*, *Cahiers du Genre*, and *Raisons Politiques*. Regarding the political science journals, I sought to identify special issues dealing with gender and feminism as well as the type of approach utilized. In the journals on gender and feminism, I sought to identify the openness to international authorship and themes. I also sought to identify the space conferred by French journals to Brazilian authors and the space Brazilian journals conferred to French authors.

Mapping the circulation of feminisms between Brazil and France: analyzing its agents

The first stage of the interactions identified between the fields of feminist studies of the two countries refers to one of its agents (feminist researchers). In order to begin the mapping of such exchanges from the perspective of the global dynamics of the circulation of ideas and knowledge, I compiled the interviews conducted with Brazilian and French scholars and organized them into three axes of analysis: intellectual conditions, academic design, and institutional conditions. The interviewees are: Helena Hirata, Miriam Grossi, Jules Falquet, Eleni Varikas, Armelle Lebras-Chopard, Genevieve Fraisse, Françoise Picq, Miriam Adelman, Cornelia Möser, and Flavia Biroli.

By analyzing Axis 1, I unveiled the intellectual conditions of exchange between Brazilian and French feminists. I confirmed the pioneering role of a series of Brazilian women who, during their exiles in France, participated in feminist groups and transmitted French feminist thinking to the Brazilian academic milieu. I found that the translations of French feminist works to Portuguese printed an important mark in the history of Brazilian feminist thought. The translators were primarily feminists who had lived in France as political exiles from Brazil in the 1970s and the 1980s. In addition, I glimpsed the global circulation

of a series of concepts linked to the history of feminist thought such as materialist feminism, *French feminism*, social relations between the sexes, gender relations, interlocked systems, intersectionality, post-colonialism, and decolonial criticisms. By analyzing Axis 2, I mapped the place of feminist studies in universities. The interviewees in Brazil and France reported the difficulty of bringing feminist discussions to universities, positioned themselves on the terms "gender" and "feminism" to designate scientific studies, and also pointed out the divisions and ideological disputes within the field of feminist studies. In Axis 3, I mapped the construction of feminist collaborative networks within universities — that is, I examined the paths found in universities so that feminist knowledge could circulate between Brazil and France. The interviewees highlighted the collaboration between France and Brazil, which started from political exile and ultimately created a theoretical-political alliance that materialized in the France-Brazil-Québec Conference in 1994. However, Brazilian researchers reported difficulties in accessing French research funding in partnership with Brazilian institutions — even with the establishment of partnerships for conferences. According to them, Brazilian research agencies are more prone to finance international research partnerships than their French counterparts. Despite the barrier of the French language in Brazil, I observed the creation of partnerships between researchers from both countries — French researchers visited Brazil more often starting in the 1990s. During the 2000s, with the support of the Brazilian government, doctoral programs and the possibilities of graduates researching abroad increased.

In Brazil, the creation of collaborative networks fosters postgraduate exchanges or *cotutelle*, while conducting research and international congresses leads to the publication of books, collections, dossiers, or academic articles. These allow the visualization of the circulation of feminist ideas derived from theoretical affinities. However, this circulation of knowledge depends on financial and institutional resources — which have diminished, as Hirata and Grossi point out.

The second empirical step of this work considered French and Brazilian journals that serve as channels for the international movement of feminist knowledge within the proposed axes of analysis. The selection of journals resulted from interviews conducted — where researchers mentioned specific publications, authorships, or thematic dossiers — as well as from bibliographic research. Besides the themes, I identified feminist authorships that promoted the circulation of the thought between Brazil and France; this identification was to operationalize some of the information obtained from the interviews I studied. Then, I analyzed the Brazilian journals. The data discussed in this paper partially reiterate the

hypothesis about the circulation of feminist thought between Brazil and France. I found interviews with feminist French theorists in Brazilian feminist journals. I also noted a recognition of the difficulties in overcoming the geographic barrier of knowledge and the challenge of integrating gender and feminist themes into broader political concepts such as democracy, justice, and political institutions. Among the international theoretical collaborations in the specific journals on gender and feminism, those of French origin stand out in the format of both articles and interviews. However, the recent increase in Latin American collaborations in journals indicates more openness to the contribution of Latin American feminist thought —not only from Brazil, but also from other countries in the Global South.

I next examined French journals and found publications on Latin American feminism, especially since the 2000s. The editorial approaches aim to share with the Francophone public the breadth and plurality of feminist perspectives, given the participation of women from Brazil and other Latin American countries. I mapped the role of scientific publication in the circulation of feminist thought in the Brazil-France axis, which illustrates the dynamic status of the global feminist research agenda.

The status of the English language shapes what is considered scientific knowledge and decisively influences the circulation of feminist thought between two countries whose languages, French and Portuguese, have Latin roots and belong to the Romance linguistic family. At this juncture, translational policies become necessary and also awaken critical positions in regards to hegemonic epistemological policies. The journals of both countries have a conscious orientation of the relations between metropolitan/central theories and peripheric translations, bearing in mind the silencing of other feminist genealogies — especially regarding the translation of articles in foreign languages.

Analysis and findings

The questioning of what is considered knowledge, the overcoming of geopolitical frontiers of knowledge, the trafficking of theories, and the opening of space to the theoretical productions of the Global South are points that appear throughout the analyses presented in this article. In addition, the analysis of the editorial committee demographics of the selected journals and their representation in the broader discursive context raises suppositions about the development of scientific networks of collaboration. There are a number of researchers who are very active in feminist journals, congresses, and institutional partnerships. Eleni Varikas, Jules Falquet. Françoise Picq, Genevieve Fraisse, Helena Hirata, Lena Levinas, Beth Lobo, and Miriam Grossi, researchers who participated in several journals and are based in

France or Brazil, played a fundamental role in the diversification of feminist approaches in journals and promoted the dissemination of foreign feminisms. This role highlights the ability of prominent researchers to promote the international diffusion of feminist works and indicates their efforts to weave an international collaborative network in the Brazil-France axis.

Throughout this article, I have sought to bring together historical, theoretical, and epistemological approaches that indicate investigative paths for the development of a cartography of feminist traveling theories between Brazil and France. In the first empirical stage of this research, I examined the first agent of the circulation of ideas — people — represented here in the interviews of and by feminist researchers working in the Brazil-France academic axis. In the second empirical stage, I examined the second agent of the circulation —commodities — represented by the feminist scientific publications in Brazil and France. The third agent of circulation — ideas — is represented by the feminist theories debated and produced by feminist researchers and disseminated as knowledge through publication in scientific journals.

As reported by the interviewees, the intellectual conditions that instigated international flows of feminist thought date from a specific context of the political exile of Brazilians in France. This moment inaugurated the publication of feminist and Latin American content, when many Brazilian women in exile for the first time came into contact with this perspective of thought. It is in this period of the 1970s, therefore, that some Brazilians — among them Anette Goldberg, Angela Xavier de Brito, Betânia Ávila, Elisabeth Lobo, Lena Lavinas, and Helena Hirata — lived in Paris, where they completed their academic degrees and were eventually associated with the transmission of French feminist theories in Brazil; hence, they are the transmitting people or the transmitters. The role of such researchers, however, was not restricted to the transmission of French feminist theories to Brazil. These exiled women also participated in the remarkable gender research groups in France such as *MAGE* 1995 — the first *CNRS* research group focused on gender issues. In addition, these researchers had an important role in translating French feminist theoretical pieces — especially since the 1980s. Later, Brazilian researchers who studied in France took experts such as Michelle Perrot and Françoise Héritier to Brazil; this facilitated the building of a consistent feminist studies network. Also, the largest Brazilian feminist academic event "*Fazendo Gênero*" and the doctoral academic opportunities abroad played a key role in the promotion of collaborative networks. The interviewees discussed sexist practices in academics, which was revealed both in the neglect of the importance of feminist research

and publications as well as in the silencing of researchers within universities. In terms of theoretical currents, according to the interviewees, it is observed that French feminism lacks intersectional analysis and imbrication of relations. Brazil, despite a series of theoretical affinities with France, was proven more receptive to postcolonial approaches and also more attentive to the emergence of new spaces that expanded the circulation of feminism worldwide — especially in Africa and Asia.

The second empirical stage of our research mapped the traveling and theoretical translations made through scientific journals[2]. The approach to translational policies became inescapable as criticisms of the impact of the overall status of the English language arose. Feminist critiques of the epistemological hierarchy mistrust the purpose of the English language as a transparent medium that only translates. Because the status of the English language is so high, publications and citations in foreign languages are disfavored; consequently, what is published in English shapes knowledge on a global scale.

In Brazil, the effort to build a channel for the expression of the women's movement and the translation of articles in English into Portuguese were part of the goals of the *REF* and *Cadernos Pagu* journals that started in the early 1990s. During the first decade of the *REF*'s existence, international collaboration was more intensified with the US and France than with Latin America. In 1999, *Cadernos Pagu* called attention to the special Dossier devoted to the 50th anniversary of Simone de Beauvoir's masterpiece 'The Second Sex'. This dossier was supported by Brazilian and French feminist experts, revealing the collaborative network of feminist research that was established beginning in the 1990s.

The *Labrys* has a strong link with French authors (which includes Jules Falquet, Genevieve Fraisse, and Françoise Picq), giving space to the discussion of radical feminism as well as Foucault and Monique Wittig's work; the journal also gives space for lesbian feminism and promotes the expansion of the voices of global feminism. The *RBCP*, a Brazilian political science journal that started in 2009, has built a plural space for theoretical reflection on the phenomenon of politics — including feminist thought.

In regards to French scientific journals, *NQF* publishes the dissident feminisms of Latin America as well as articles by Brazilian women such as Sueli Carneiro and Jurema Werneck and the Caribbean author Ochy Curiel. *CEDREF* and *Cahiers du Genre* also present the objective of promoting the circulation of international feminist scientific-academic information as well as the translation and publication of foreign texts for the Francophone

[2] See on appendix 2 and 3 covers from the selected scientific journals.

community. Both journals give space to emerging feminist issues, postcolonialism, decolonialism, queer studies, analyses of exiled Brazilians living in France, and other issues related to Brazil and Latin America. Among the Brazilian authors with publications in these journals are Lélia González, Claudia Pons Cardoso, Anette Goldberg, Céli Pinto, Albertina Oliveira, and Helena Hirata; the Brazilian researchers interviewed for this article — Eleni Varikas, Genevieve Fraisse, and Jules Falquet have also published in these journals. Recent issues of the *Raisons Politiques* journal indicate the openness of French feminists as well as questioning the hegemonic structures of knowledge in relation to Latin American feminisms.

Conclusions

The analyses outlined throughout this article illustrate the dynamic status of the global feminist research agenda, which is composed of university research centers, scientific publications, congresses and international colloquia, the establishment of academic exchange agreements, and the development of collaborative research networks. Through our research, I connected with scholars who played key roles in the movement of feminist thought between Brazil and France from 1974-2016. These researchers are: Albertina de Oliveira Costa, Anette Goldberg, Angela Xavier de Brito, Bethania Ávila, Christine Delphy, Claudia Fonseca, Eleni Varikas, Elisabeth Lobo, Françoise Héritier, Françoise Picq, Heleieth Saffioti, Helena Hirata, Lena Lavinas, Michelle Perrot, Miriam Grossi, Jules Falquet, and Tania Navarro. I observed a flow of feminist ideas coming from France to Brazil between the years 1974 and 1985 as the result of our bibliographical and empirical research. Likewise, by analyzing the years of 2000 to 2016, I saw the global expansion and dynamization of feminist theoretical flows raising critical epistemologies as well as feminist ideas from the Global South occupying more space in discussions of the logic of the international circulation of ideas. I perceived a global reconfiguration of the field of feminist thought, where theoretical traveling from one region to another intensifies, diversifies, and requires an increased effort in regards to language translation policies.

This article intended to give visibility to the theoretical exchanges and the establishment of dialogues in the agenda of feminist scientific research in the Brazil-France axis. Our mapping of feminist thought identified the socio-political conditions necessary for the development and diversification of discussions and to deepen the understanding of the production of feminist knowledge from now on. The elements discussed here indicate a continuity in the process of feminist theoretical exchanges between Brazil and France as well as the expansion of networks through the increasing collaborations made with researchers in other countries.

Future research may broaden the analytical scope of circulation of feminist thought, addressing triangulations and seeking to incorporate into intellectual production other Latin American feminist groups emerging in Europe (i.e., Portugal, the Netherlands, and Sweden). The development of feminist studies in Argentina and Chile, countries that share with Brazil a political history of military dictatorship and exile, could be analyzed in order to elucidate the current challenges of expanding feminist collaboration in South America. The expansion of the analytical scope to include Latin America, Europe, and North America will allow researchers to map the "feminist reverberations, expansive waves moving from scattered epicenters" (Scott 2012, 355) on the global circulation of knowledge. This proposal will also allow dissident feminisms from the Global South to be unveiled, which will help build alliances for "autonomous and critical epistemology to hegemonic colonialities" (Cusicanqui 2010, 73) regarding feminist ideas in Latin America.

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Appendix

1. Nosotras bulletin

Nosotras' edition, from Grupo Latinoamericano de Mujeres. Cover and back-cover, n. 21-22, September-October, 1975.





Source: Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC), Université de Nanterre, Paris, France.

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

Source: https://www.labrys.net.br

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

Sources: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ref/index;
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3. French journals

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



Sources: https://www.antipodes.ch/revues/nqf; http://cahiers_du_genre.pouchet.cnrs.fr; http://www.cedref.univ-paris7.fr/-Les-cahiers-du-CEDREF-; http://www.sciencespo.fr/ecole-doctorale/fr/content/raisons-politiques#a.

ENSAYO

La "4T" no es populismo: una propuesta conceptual para la lectura del fenómeno político en México después del 2018

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Resumen

En el presente trabajo intentamos proponer una categoría distinta para el análisis del fenómeno que constituye el gobierno en México conocido como "Cuarta Transformación". Para ello, problematizaremos un poco sobre el tratamiento que el concepto de populismo supone al utilizarse en este tipo de fenómenos y opondremos, a su vez, la categoría de "Economía moral de la multitud" acuñada y desarrollada por el historiador británico Edward Palmer Thompson a mediados del siglo pasado. La crítica y el análisis de la noción de populismo estarán planteados desde una perspectiva histórica, esperando con ello mostrar la insuficiencia del concepto en tanto perteneciente a un momento distinto del actual.

Palabras clave

Cuarta transformación; Economía moral; Identidades; Neoliberalismo; Populismo

Abstract

In this work, we attempt to propose a different category for the analysis of the government in Mexico known as "Fourth Transformation". To do so, we will discuss on the treatment that the concept of populism implies when used in this type of phenomenon and we will oppose, in turn, the category of "Moral economy of the multitudes" formulated and developed by the British historian Edward Palmer Thompson in the middle of the last century. The critique and analysis of the notion of populism will be approached from a historical perspective, hoping to show the concept's inadequacy as belonging to a time different from the present.

Keywords

Fourth transformation; Identities; Moral economy; Neoliberalism; Populism

Introducción: el populismo y su suelo histórico

Es un lugar común recurrir al concepto de populismo para acusar a determinada práctica o descalificar a personajes públicos que optan por dirigir su atención a demandas masivas o con un discurso más o menos plural caracterizado por la simplicidad y que, en cuanto tal, resulta polémico. El populismo, categoría que, frente a su cuantiosa utilización carece de definición aceptable, introduce una serie de problemáticas al momento de ser tematizada. En primer lugar, suele estar históricamente ligada a fenómenos cercanos o adscritos a la izquierda. Lázaro Cárdenas, Getulio Vargas, Juan Domingo Perón son nombres que resuenan en la memoria al pensar en ejemplos de políticas populistas. En segundo lugar, surge también el asunto de los populismos de derecha: los fascismos europeos, por ejemplo, surgieron en contextos de profunda inestabilidad política, social y, sobre todo, de una marcada crisis económica.

En todo caso, podemos resaltar algunos aspectos que nos ayudarían a identificar el suelo histórico sobre el que surge el fenómeno populista. En primer término, es casi generalizado que su discurso y las políticas implementadas fueron dirigidos hacia un sector muy particular: los desposeídos, de forma especial obreros y campesinos. En segundo lugar, que su contexto ideológico estaba marcado por una polarización a nivel global que marcó, en gran medida, la agenda política internacional y sobre la cual se dictó la postura de las potencias mundiales respecto de los gobiernos populistas.

Por otra parte, el origen mismo del término es anterior, surge durante las polémicas del partido bolchevique en las postrimerías del siglo XIX y su debate, en particular, con los mencheviques. Lenin caracterizaba a los populistas como defensores de los intereses de la pequeña burguesía (Lenin 1971, 13) que, si bien enfrentaban al zarismo, no atacaban los intereses de la clase burguesa, de modo tal que, estaban emparentados con el liberalismo burgués. En la actualidad, los intentos de caracterización del populismo no hacen más que hacer más ambigua la noción. Sin embargo, es posible intentar elaborar un mapeo sobre lo comúnmente aceptado cuando se habla de populismo, sin que ello signifique proponer una definición acabada del mismo.

Dado el carácter ambiguo del concepto de populismo, el objetivo del presente trabajo es proponer un concepto alternativo que parta analíticamente de elementos distintos a los del populismo. Tal concepto es "economía moral de la multitud", elaborado por el historiador británico marxista Edward Palmer Thompson en los años setenta del siglo pasado. Para ello, será necesario pasar una breve revista sobre algunos textos que toman por tema al populismo para tratar de identificar consensos con los cuales generar una problematización

que nos permita introducir nuestra propuesta conceptual a modo de contrapunto. Será necesario hacer también, una breve caracterización de la categoría de Thompson y sus adecuaciones necesarias para analizar el momento actual.

Una cansada pero necesaria remisión

Pierre Ronsavallon, historiador y sociólogo francés, en su obra *El siglo del populismo*, comenta acerca de dicha noción: "En lo que atañe a la concepción populista de la representación, se vincula a la preeminencia otorgada a la figura de un «hombre-pueblo» con capacidad sensible de encarnación destinada a remediar el estado de mala representación *[mal-representation]* existente" (Rosanvallon 2020, 15). Guadalupe Salmorán Villar, abogada y politóloga mexicana en su obra *Populismo. Historia y geografía de un concepto*, define al populismo como:

> (…) un tipo de régimen, caracterizado por una peculiar relación inmediata y simpatizante entre el pueblo, concebido como un macro-sujeto colectivo homogéneo, y un sujeto individual, con frecuencia carismático o con aspiraciones carismáticas, que no sólo se ofrece como "guía", "amigo del pueblo" y su protector, sino que pretende además expresar la esencia y garantizar la integridad del propio "pueblo". En esta dimensión de significado, el "populismo" se delinea como una variante o subclase de la autocracia, favorecida por formas de gobierno abiertamente verticalizadas, aunque no sea fácil ubicarla en modo unívoco —al menos no *prima facie*— en una sola vertiente del espectro político. De allí la aparente naturaleza proteiforme de los populismos, y la extrema variabilidad de su colocación a lo largo del eje "derecha"-"izquierda". (Salmorán Villar 2021, XXIII)

Y más adelante:

> No es el pueblo el que produce el populismo. Son los populistas los que "producen" al pueblo. El pueblo, el "señor Pueblo", no existe. No obstante, los individuos que creen que exista, que creen ser parte del pueblo, de ser "pueblo", lo hacen existir: todas las veces que aclaman a su jefe, a este o aquel jefecillo que logra en una u otra ocasión modelar la rabia y el miedo en la identidad colectiva ficticia de un "pueblo". (Salmorán Villar 2021, XXIV)

Casi en la misma línea, José María Perceval, profesor de periodismo español, escribe en *El populismo. Cómo las multitudes han sido temidas, manipuladas y seducidas*, de 2020:

> El *pueblo* es una invención, como cualquier otra construcción humana, pero una invención que funciona de una forma emocional, una entelequia en que los deseos se confunden fácilmente con las realidades. Cuando existe realmente, no se habla de él, y cuando se habla de él, es porque alguien lo utiliza con un fin determinado. […]Por lo tanto, el pueblo siempre es un recuerdo nostálgico de una situación que ha desaparecido, que pertenece a un paraíso origina lo que se encuentra reprimido por intereses de la casta dominante. (Perceval 2020, 9-10)

Y Josep Pradas, filósofo español, en *De la demagogia al populismo y otros escritos co-laterales*, también define:

> En el caso del populismo, el político capta los deseos latentes en el pueblo, los interioriza y asume como propios, conecta con la opinión del popular y sintoniza con sus emociones, y finalmente se presenta como quien está dispuesto a realizar lo que el pueblo espera, y de esta forma consigue el poder o mantenerse en él. Ésta es la estrategia populista, que también constituye una práctica habitual en la democracia de todas las formas y épocas. Al contrario que el político demagógico, el populista seduce mediante la adulación y la exaltación de lo que el pueblo desea. Prescinde de la argumentación, de la presentación de pros y contras, y renuncia a convencer a los ciudadanos con una idea que pretende ser mejor que las otras; no necesita seducir las almas con esos argumentos, sino atraerlas diciendo lo que están esperando oír; acude a consignas interiorizadas por la cultura popular, al atavismo y a la religiosidad, a los instintos incontrolados de los sectores sociales con menor formación, a los sentimientos internos que conforman una especie de *sabiduría sin reflexión* (…) (Pradas 2009, 16)

Ante todo, solicitamos al lector nos dispense por este recorrido que, aunque parezca exagerado, es aún brevísimo sobre unas formas, más o menos actuales, de intentar conceptualizar al populismo. En todo caso, ¿qué significan todas estas enunciaciones respecto del mismo fenómeno? Los libros de cada autor, muy distintos entre sí, convienen, tal vez de manera metodológica, en partir de una suerte de presupuestos para hablar del populismo. Si bien, la mayoría de ellos están de acuerdo en manifestar las dificultades o la imposibilidad de dar una definición definitiva del término, todos parecen tener claras ciertas condiciones en que se da en la realidad. ¿Qué tienen en común todos ellos?

Dado que, si seguimos a todos estos autores en sus obras, a veces voluminosas, nos encontraremos con la necesidad de incorporar un sólido aparato contextual para intentar aprehender el fenómeno referido. Nos podemos topar con, al menos, una cualidad abstracta que toca al concepto en cuanto tal. Al igual que la noción de pueblo, noción que pronto muestra también su cualidad problemática, el populismo otorga un papel definido a este correlato suyo. El pueblo, la masa, es *pasiva*. El agente, la personalidad carismática, influyente, retórica y sobresaliente la constituye, la significa y dota de rostro.

Si nos detenemos en este aspecto podríamos tener un punto de partida. El pueblo, repetimos, tiene un lugar o papel, pasivo. ¿Cómo clarificar, entonces, el concepto de populismo? Partiendo de la noción de pueblo, decíamos, nos encontraremos con definiciones que requieren un lugar y tiempo determinados. Sin embargo, más en la actualidad, es difícil, aún con ello, dotar de una caracterización más o menos extensiva a esta categoría. Lo que llamamos pueblo pronto puede escapar a una definición dada la cualidad heterogénea y plural en lo que toca a su dimensión identitaria.

Una lectura de la historia

A mediados del siglo XX, el panorama mundial estaba dominado por la oposición entre dos grandes bloques, el occidente capitalista y el bloque socialista. Esto nos habla de un gran sujeto abstracto que fue, por decirlo así, el protagonista de demandas, organizaciones y luchas. Pero también el objetivo de ataques, represiones y cooptaciones. El proletariado y, si queremos, los desposeídos en general, constituían el universal identitario que, con la promesa de la revolución, estaba llamado a emanciparse de las desigualdades. Podríamos definir esto también como el modelo de las clases sociales.

Lejos de parecer una idea inoperante en la actualidad, el proletariado facturó, entre otras cosas, nociones muy útiles o simplificadoras incluso para el análisis social, tal es el caso de la "conciencia de clase". Dicho concepto explicaba muchos fenómenos en la reflexión clásica, de manera concreta en la marxista. Hablar de conciencia de clase en la actualidad, es claro, no sólo representa poco, sino que la misma categoría da la impresión de haber cedido su lugar a otro tipo de reconocimientos a nivel de lo subjetivo; las identidades múltiples.

Éste fenómeno es significativo en la medida en que podemos identificar su rendimiento, en cuanto representación y concepto, a lo largo del corto siglo XX. Su difuminación ocupa parte de la reflexión filosófica del llamado posmodernismo, en particular algunos textos de Jean-François Lyotard. La llamada muerte de las grandes narrativas o metarrelatos, en lo fundamental, hace referencia a la pérdida de un sentido unitario, un sentido histórico si se quiere, luego de la caída del Muro de Berlín. Lejos de constituir un enclave ideológico para occidente, podemos hablar de un cisma. Como algunos historiadores han señalado, el llamado "fin de la historia" tuvo consecuencias en lo que respecta a la valoración del pasado y del futuro.

La experiencia de la derrota de 1989, se puede insertar en un proceso de mediano plazo que iniciaría en 1968, con un punto álgido en el Mayo Francés y la Primavera de Praga. Por un lado, la represión en occidente y por el otro, la decepción de la represión por parte de los soviéticos, sociedad que debía fungir como faro para las luchas globales. La caída del muro de Berlín sintetiza la erosión del paradigma de la revolución y, más en concreto, la entrada en un momento histórico de falta de alternativas al modelo occidental. No es casual que en esa época se difuminara el gran sujeto de las luchas del periodo anterior y surgieran en su lugar, aunque nacidas de él, movimientos que reivindicaban demandas distintas a las laborales.

Ahora bien, la implementación del modelo neoliberal inicia también alrededor del mismo periodo. En América latina son las dictaduras las que comienzan a desmantelar el

modelo de estado de bienestar en unos casos, así como los tránsitos más o menos orientados a la izquierda. Podríamos interpretar esto como un socavamiento de la modernidad, o al menos del modelo de sociedad plateado por la modernidad occidental. Para el caso mexicano, aún con la ausencia de una dictadura, el proceso fue más o menos similar pues, se desmantelaron las conquistas que, desde el cardenismo, venían definiendo la llamada política de masas.

Sergio Zermeño, en su análisis de principios de los noventa, expone lo anterior de la siguiente manera:

> La crítica central al Tratado de Libre Comercio y a la integración globalizante que lo respalda es, pues, que constituye un *disolvente poderosísimo de lo social*: de las identidades colectivas y los espacios de interacción de comunicativa y de formación crítica de lo público. En lo fundamental esta pérdida de lo público no está ligada a la atomización en torno al consumidor individualista-posesivo propia de las sociedades centrales, sino a la incultura y miseria masificadas con formas organizativas verticalizadas. La disolvencia de la sociedad se explica aquí, y de manera mucho más radical que en los países desarrollados, por la conjunción de: a] una creciente masificación y pauperización producto de los cambios acelerados del nuevo modelo; b] un desmantelamiento acelerado de los actores de la sociedad civil, particularmente de los actores de la modernidad; c] un refugio en la vida privada por parte de los sectores integrados al consumo y a la modernización, convencidos ideológicamente de que la culpa de la crisis de la época vino de las intervenciones centralizadas y la vida republicana (populismos, socialismos, estados de bienestar,); y en fin, d] una acción deliberada desde los aparatos estatales que, conscientes de la precariedad del orden en esta situación de cambio acelerado y masificación, actúan en todos los frentes posibles para desmantelar identidades colectivas inconvenientes, ya se trate de gremios, partidos, organizaciones sociales y políticas o de universidades, medios de comunicación, etcétera. (Zermeño 1996, 12)

Es decir, pasamos de un modelo "clásico" de sociedad industrial, con un actor delineado y definido, así como su contraparte, a un modelo de fragmentación social propio de las llamadas sociedades pos-industriales. Es de llamar la atención que el populismo clásico del caso mexicano tuviera lugar en el referido momento histórico. Lo que intentamos evidenciar aquí, es el plano, si lo queremos llamar así, pos-ideológico en el que todavía nos encontramos, en contraste con el panorama en el que surge el fenómeno populista del cardenismo, como elemento de muestreo para comparar el tipo de sociedades en las que aparece la categoría.

Zermeño también puntualiza sobre esto último:

> Ante la fragmentación, la desarticulación y la heterogeneidad de los actores históricos, de las clases modernas y de las manifestaciones políticas en un escenario latinoamericano golpeado, al mismo tiempo, por las dictaduras y la severidad de la crisis económica, las visiones de reclusión defensiva, identidad restringida y, en una palabra, las visiones en torno a la comunidad, fueron los ordenadores éticos y conceptuales con que los latinoamericanos

> comenzamos a pensar nuestra realidad en el paso de los setenta a los ochenta. (Zermeño 1996, 40)

Podemos apuntar una primera diferenciación entre el panorama ideológico de mediados del siglo XX y la actualidad. El populismo ha supuesto una noción de pueblo, más o menos unitaria o clásica, aunque algunos autores reconocen su heterogeneidad, sólo para dotarle una acción nula o casi nula frente a la preeminencia del líder carismático. Con ello se deja de lado la posible acción colectiva como fuerza causal equivalente a las cualidades personales del populista. ¿Qué pasa si pensamos esto al revés? No, ciertamente, el líder explicado desde las masas, sino, la conjunción de ambos elementos, en una dialéctica de acción conjunta.

La economía moral de la multitud

Una primera dificultad que ha arrojado el abandono de la noción de clase social es la claridad con que, a través de ella, se podían explicar fenómenos político-ideológicos como huelgas, movilizaciones, boicoteos, protestas y participaciones o fundaciones partidistas. En una sociedad fragmentada es difícil dotar de unidad y, más todavía, encontrar un concepto sustituto de la clase social o el proletariado. Sin embargo, si nos detenemos un poco en la lectura histórica podremos ver que la llamada modernidad, caracterizada por el estado benefactor y el paradigma industrial, se halla por así decirlo, en un inter: entre las sociedades preindustriales y pos-industriales.[1]

Con la ausencia conceptual antes descrita nos encontramos con la necesidad de dotar de una caracterización más que unitaria, al menos asequible, en términos conceptuales, para dar sentido a la sociedad después del *desmantelamiento* de la modernidad. En ese sentido, nos inclinamos por retomar una idea de explicación planteada para las sociedades preindustriales, para explicar fenómenos políticos donde, también había una sociedad fragmentada, tampoco podía hablarse, en sentido estricto, de clases sociales y la composición de las masas era profundamente heterogénea.

En el 2019, el actual presidente de México, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, publicó un libro titulado *Hacia una economía moral*. En él se abordan temas respecto de su proyecto político, así como sus preocupaciones respecto de temas (y problemas) como seguridad, corrupción y economía entre otros. Lo que nos pareció significativo fue el título. En efecto, "economía moral" fue el concepto explicativo con que un historiador británico, Edward

[1] Tomamos la categoría como marcador temporal y su cualidad teórica. Pues implicaría la entrada en los debates sobre su validez, condición que rebasa los objetivos de este trabajo.

Palmer Thompson, analizó ciertas movilizaciones, similares a boicots, de la Inglaterra del siglo XVIII.

Thompson habló de una "economía moral de la multitud". Al no poder hacer referencia a clases sociales o proletariado en una nación preindustrial tuvo que renunciar también a un concepto que, en determinadas condiciones, podía explicar muy fácilmente los fenómenos por él descritos: la conciencia de clase. De igual forma, la multitud fue el término con el que caracterizó a las masas, por demás heterogéneas, que componían a los sujetos analizados. Lo que descubrió es que, aún con la ausencia de dichas herramientas analíticas, se observaba en esas sociedades cierta inteligencia colectiva que no estaba fundada en fenómenos de organización política modernos, pero tampoco se trataba de simples hordas irracionales carentes de estructuración.

Esta economía moral no tenía, como tal, un fundamento "corporativo", tampoco político, en el sentido moderno del mismo (asociaciones, partidos, ideologías). Sin embargo, constituían la expresión de cierta organización frente a un objetivo común. Se trató, según lo que podemos concluir, de cierto sentido compartido de lo bueno y lo malo para la comunidad, más allá de inclinaciones o identidades personales:

> […] basado en una idea tradicional de las normas y obligaciones sociales, de las funciones económicas propias de los distintos sectores dentro de la comunidad que, tomadas en conjunto, puede decirse que constituían la: "economía «moral» de los pobres", Un atropello a estos supuestos morales, tanto como la privación en sí, constituía la ocasión habitual para la acción directa. (Thompson 1979, 66)

Para contextualizar un poco, durante el periodo descrito por Thompson, algunos precios de los materiales necesarios para la elaboración del pan, elemento clave en la dieta británica de la época, se veían elevados hacia los pobres, a diferencia de los grandes comerciantes y tenderos. Dicha acción provocaba sublevaciones organizadas por los más desfavorecidos, quema de molinos y campos de trigo, asalto a transportes de carga, entre otros. Todo ello para conminar al gobierno a regular los precios de dichas subsistencias, vale decir; para bajar los precios.

Dos de los elementos que más generan preguntas en los análisis de Thompson son, en primer término, la cuestión organizativa y, en segundo lugar, qué es lo que daba cohesión a un grupo social de desposeídos, sobre lo primero el historiador apuntó:

> Pues los pobres tenían sus propias fuentes de información. Trabajaban en los puertos. Transportaban las barcazas a lo largo de los canales. Conducían los carros y manejaban las barreras de peaje. Trabajaban en los graneros y molinos... Con frecuencia conocían los hechos locales mucho mejor que la *gentry;* en muchas acciones fueron derechos a las provisiones de grano escondidas cuya existencia habían negado, de buena fe, a los jueces de

> paz. Si es cierto que los rumores iban muchas veces más allá de todo límite, tenían siempre al menos su raíz en una ligera base de realidad. (Thompson 1979, 108)

Es decir, se trataba de una relación más directa, más pragmática si queremos verla así, lejos de las grandes entidades abstractas, como lo precios, demanda, oferta y la manera en que su aumento afectaba a los sectores vulnerables. Años más tarde, tras los debates que su análisis propició, Thompson resumiría su interpretación: "Si tenían, como demuestra mi ensayo, argumentos independientes e inteligentes acerca del funcionamiento de los mercados, pero eran de mercados reales en lugar de las relaciones teorizadas del mercado" (Thompson 1995, 312).

Respecto de aquello que dotaba de cierta unidad al grupo social en acción, Thompson habla acerca de la convivencia en los lugares públicos, el populacho, la plaza, el ambiente común compartido de los diversos trabajos que llevaban a cabo los pobres. Una suerte de sentido colectivo *consuetudinario*:

> Pocos rituales folk1óricos han sobrevivido con tanto vigor hasta fines del siglo XVIII como toda la parafernalia hogareña durante la cosecha, con sus encantos, sus cenas, sus ferias y festivales; incluso en áreas fabriles el año transcurría todavía al ritmo de las estaciones y no al de los bancos. (Thompson 1979, 132)

Estos elementos se conjugaban en lo que Thompson denominó "motines de subsistencias", que consistían en las acciones antes mencionadas para forzar la regulación de precios. Sobre esto último, el historiador británico hace una aclaración importante: "La acción central en este modelo no es el saqueo de graneros ni el robo de grano o harina sino el acto de «fijar el precio»" (Thompson 1979, 100).

La sociedad descrita parece admitir al menos dos caracteres constitutivos: se trataba de una sociedad heterogénea, en cuanto no se puede hablar de clases sociales y, por tanto, tampoco de una conciencia de clase. Por otra parte, nos dice también que cierto sentido de comunidad puede hallarse tras el grueso de las diferencias sociales, así como una orientación de acción respecto de fenómenos de consecuencias más o menos amplias. Sobre la configuración de lo que Thompson llama multitud surgen ciertos problemas: "La composición de la multitud en cuanto a profesiones nos proporciona pocas sorpresas. Era (parece) bastante representativa de las ocupaciones de las «clases más bajas» en las zonas de motines" (Thompson 1979, 112).

Una apuesta arriesgada

Ahora bien, por ahora pareciera que la problemática poco o nada tiene que ver con el asunto del populismo. Sin embargo, el pequeño recorrido que hicimos sobre el análisis de Thompson, aunque pueda parecer anticlimático, nos ha dotado de una posible

conceptualización para poder problematizar en el asunto de los populismos en la actualidad. La "economía moral de la multitud" es una categoría explicativa para la acción colectiva, allí donde se carece del instrumental clásico de las clases sociales, el proletariado, los sindicatos, los partidos, etc. Ya con Zermeño veíamos el desgaste de dichas nociones con las llamadas identidades restringidas.

Haríamos bien en aclarar la posible debilidad de la categoría historiográfica que retomamos, el asunto de la "multitud". La inserción de un concepto como multitud, aplicado a las sociedades preindustriales para su uso en fenómenos actuales puede ser anacrónica en tanto que, sostenemos, es lo que sucede con el término de populismo. Un concepto arrancado de la historicidad de donde surgió. Así como su implementación en un escenario ideológico que, como nos hemos esforzado en demostrar, dista mucho del de mediados del siglo XX.

Por ahora tenemos una ventaja, las sociedades preindustriales observan fenómenos de cercanía con el panorama actual: la inoperancia satisfactoria de la noción de clase, la fragmentación social y la multiplicidad de identidades compartiendo un suelo común. A esto podemos añadir la experiencia histórica del siglo XX, bien que agotado, pero presente en la propia difuminación de la modernidad como herencia actual.

Respecto de la multitud, contamos con la propuesta de Michael Hardt y Antonio Negri. Filósofos italianos que proponen una idea de *multitud* para dotar de unidad a las sociedades actuales. Adscritos ellos mismos al movimiento conocido como post-marxismo, ambos reconocen que el proletariado es una noción insuficiente e inoperante en el panorama postideológico actual. Sin embargo, no por ello los sentidos de comunidad han desaparecido, sino que se constituyen a otros niveles de los *tradicionales*. Para Hardt y Negri, el paradigma industrial fue suplantado por el de las comunicaciones. En el trabajo se lleva a cabo una forma de generación de sentido y comunidad que también pasó del capitalismo industrial (proletariado) a las redes de cooperación sobre un suelo de conocimiento común (multitud): El propio trabajo tiende hacia las transformaciones de la economía para crear y ser absorbida en redes de cooperación y comunicación. Todas las personas que utilizan en su trabajo la información y el conocimiento -desde el agricultor que desarrolla simientes dotadas de propiedades específicas hasta el programador informático- se apoyan en el acervo común del conocimiento que han recibido de otros, y crean a su vez nuevo conocimiento común (Hardt y Negri 2004, 18).

En este sentido, habría también una suerte de consenso compartido en lo tocante al desarrollo comunicativo colectivo. Cierto es que, en un nivel más o menos local, las

comunicaciones han abierto un espectro muy amplio respecto de cierto léxico popular, vale decir, una *jerga* que circula por una red cada vez más amplia, red cuya composición puede ser muy variada. Pensemos por ejemplo en colonias populares donde conviven estudiantes, obreros, amas de casa y, en fin, personas con las más diversas actividades que, sin embargo, no tienen dificultad para construir un sentido comunitario de pertenencia.

Para los autores, el trabajo material se halla en conjunción con el trabajo inmaterial, que tiene que ver con la construcción de subjetividades. Aquí podríamos interpretar esto como un desarrollo de la idea de *fuerzas productivas* tal que, en ellas también se hace presente la superación del paradigma fordista industrial y la incorporación de las comunicaciones como creadoras de la subjetividad:

> De este modo, los medios de comunicación crean afectos y formas de vida, En realidad todas las formas de comunicación combinan la producción de símbolos, de lenguaje y de información con la producción de afectos. Por otra parte, el trabajo inmaterial casi siempre se combina con alguna forma de trabajo material: el personal sanitario, por ejemplo, realiza tareas afectivas, cognitivas y lingüísticas al mismo tiempo que un trabajo material, como limpiar cuñas y cambiar vendajes. (Hardt, Negri 2004, 137)

Uno de los cambios, de hecho, traídos por la experiencia de la sociedad industrial capitalista respecto del tipo de sociedades descritas por Thompson es este. Mientras que la gran identidad del siglo XX, por así decirlo, estribó en la cualidad de desposesión de los medios de producción por parte de un sector, el sujeto histórico de los populismos clásicos. En las sociedades actuales dicha identidad no está anclada al modelo del proletariado como referencia diferencial respecto de las burguesías o la sociedad política. La fragmentación social de finales del siglo pasado parece, según nuestra interpretación, haber reconfigurado los criterios identitarios de diversos colectivos que aparecieron como resultado de la erosión del proletariado como sujeto del metarrelato de la modernidad.

Hardt y Negri señalan:

> Las formas centrales de la cooperación productiva ya no las crea el capitalista como parte del proyecto de organización del trabajo sino que, cada vez más, emergen de las energías productivas del trabajo mismo. Esta es, de hecho, la característica clave del trabajo inmaterial: producir comunicación, relaciones sociales y cooperación. (Hardt y Negri 2004, 143)

Aquí podemos ensayar ya una primera objeción a la interpretación de los populismos actuales, pues, en la medida en que retoma al pueblo, como sujeto del análisis clásico de los populismos, dotándole un papel pasivo frente al líder carismático, se olvida de la complejidad que ha supuesto el llamado "fin de la historia" y el reordenamiento del mundo a partir del abandono de la vieja oposición occidente capitalista-bloque socialista.

Una lectura del fenómeno de la llamada Cuarta Transformación en México, desde ésta óptica, es decir, desde la economía moral de la multitud, cobraría la forma de un motín de subsistencias. Sin embargo, no hablamos aquí de sociedades con poca o nula experiencia política o laboral, tampoco de pobres por completo ajenos a las estructuras laborales capitalistas, todo por el contrario, la experiencia del siglo XX configura a la multitud de manera análoga a como Hardt y Negri la describen, el campo de acción es contemporáneo. Hablamos de una acción colectiva de avalar a un líder más o menos cercano a la izquierda luego de una experiencia de décadas de implementación de extractivismo neoliberal conjugado con un proceso de descomposición del tejido social en el cual, la misma sociedad se amotinó contra un tipo tradicional de política partidista.

Aquí es donde, aparte de lo anterior, habría que insertar la figura carismática, contestataria, crítica, al parecer incorruptible y, en cuanto tal, polémica de un líder como Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Mandatario que, a fechas en que escribimos esto, cuenta con un porcentaje de aprobación ciudadana de alrededor del 65% (Márquez 2023). Aunque se trata de una conceptualización arriesgada, sería la ciudadanía la que, a partir de la incorporación de la experiencia del pasado reciente neoliberal, apostó por el líder carismático de izquierda, en función de un consenso más o menos compartido respecto de la justicia social, es decir, una suerte de moralidad que también nos habla del cinismo de la política mexicana de los últimos sexenios, en otras palabras, un arranque de economía moral respecto de lo que es justo a partir de un sentido de comunidad y de diferenciación con aquellos sectores "acomodados"[2].

Economía moral de la multitud es un concepto que bien puede explicar los fenómenos políticos en el ámbito de lo local, toda vez que su desarrollo y los presupuestos que lo componen tienen mayor aplicabilidad en tanto se acerquen más a casos a escala micro social. No obstante, consideramos que, como propuesta alternativa frente al populismo, tiene la ventaja de recuperar el papel activo de lo que este último denominó como "pueblo", a partir de sus heterogeneidades y fragmentaciones, mismas que consideramos se han dejado de lado en su ya problemática definición.

[2] Un tema derivado de esto es la cuestión de la llamada "polarización" que en la jerga actual de los medios, sobre todo redes sociales, se ha enmarcado en la oposición "chairo-fifí". Una problematización interesante podría partir de la tematización del llamado populismo a partir de este fenómeno y sus posibilidades explicativas al respecto. México no es, en este sentido, caso aparte, "fifí" como mote tiene sus símiles como los "mermeleros" en Perú o los "gomelos" en Colombia.

Conclusiones

En una metáfora clínica, algún médico observó alguna vez: "Los niños y los ancianos tienen más en común que las personas que están en medio", en ese sentido, aunque no de manera ingenua, es que hemos querido recuperar la noción de "economía moral de la multitud". En términos de los aportes que el análisis de las sociedades preindustriales puede ofrecernos para la comprensión del momento histórico político actual. Ante todo, podemos identificar ciertos elementos que resultan del análisis.

En primer lugar, aparte de la dificultad de definir de manera concisa o encontrar consenso en la caracterización del término populismo, este concepto implica, las más de las veces, dotar de un papel pasivo a su contraparte constitutiva, el pueblo. Se ignora con ello que las *masas* tienen cierta inteligencia que no necesariamente responde al mero ardid de un político carismático. De igual forma, "el pueblo" adquiere una cualidad sustantiva que, para el momento histórico actual, parecería no corresponder con el mosaico cultural existente, lo que nos lleva al siguiente punto.

El populismo nace en el seno de *la modernidad*, con un sujeto histórico más o menos nítido, cuyo origen lo hallamos en el siglo XIX, pero con un desarrollo profundo en el siglo XX que, ideológicamente, terminaría en 1989. Lo que quiere decir que el concepto populismo parte, por decirlo así, del desconocimiento de la difuminación de dicho sujeto y su fragmentación en identidades restringidas que ya no observan los supuestos sobre los que se construyó durante la mitad del siglo pasado. Es decir, se trataría casi de una categoría anacrónica pues, ni hay un sujeto histórico delineado, ni el pueblo encarna la cohesión que, medianamente, podía identificarse en los populismos clásicos.

La economía moral de la multitud es, pues, una propuesta conceptual que intenta reconciliar la organización más o menos sistemática y colectiva con un fin político en el seno de sociedades post-ideológicas y fragmentadas frente a fenómenos que podrían caracterizarse como populismos. Poniendo el foco de atención en la capacidad conjunta de *las masas*, incorporando cierta inteligencia colectiva y anclando dicha capacidad en las formas postindustriales del capitalismo, la economía moral de la multitud, consideramos, nos ayuda a clarificar fenómenos políticos que supondrían ciertos elementos sociales ya inoperantes para su comprensión y explicación.

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AVANCES DE INVESTIGACIÓN

Matongé, Muizenberg e Brás de Pina: uma breve comparação entre redutos da diáspora congolesa no sul e no norte global

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Resumo

A presente nota de pesquisa tem como objetivo fazer uma breve análise das aproximações e distanciamentos nas condições sociais e históricas de imigrantes provenientes da República Democrática do Congo (RDC) em três redutos da comunidade congolesa em centros urbanos no exterior: Matongé, em Bruxelas (Bélgica), Muizenberg, na Cidade do Cabo (África do Sul), e Brás de Pina, na cidade do Rio de Janeiro (Brasil). O trabalho tem, como fontes, artigos jornalísticos e materiais acadêmicos.

Palavras-chave

Brás de Pina; Bruxelas; Cidade do Cabo; Diáspora congolesa; Matongé; Muizenberg; República Democrática do Congo; Rio de Janeiro

Abstract

This research note aims to make a brief analysis of similarities and differences in the social and historical conditions of immigrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in three strongholds of the Congolese community in urban centers abroad: Matongé, in Brussels (Belgium), Muizenberg, in Cape Town (South Africa), and Brás de Pina, in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). The work has, as sources, journalistic articles and academic materials.

Keywords

Brás de Pina; Brussels; Cape Town; Congolese diaspora; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Matongé; Muizenberg; Rio de Janeiro

Introdução

A presente nota de pesquisa tem como objetivo fazer uma breve análise das aproximações e distanciamentos nas condições sociais e históricas de imigrantes provenientes da República Democrática do Congo (RDC) em três redutos da comunidade congolesa em centros urbanos no exterior: Matongé, em Bruxelas (Bélgica), Muizenberg, na Cidade do Cabo (África do Sul), e Brás de Pina, na cidade do Rio de Janeiro (Brasil). A RDC vive uma situação de instabilidade política, confrontos armados, estupros e assassinatos e, por estas razões, tem um dos grandes movimentos de deslocamento humano involuntário no mundo: só em junho de 2019, 300 mil pessoas precisaram abandonar suas casas na região nordeste da nação (Figueira e Masengu 2020).

O texto conta com dados parciais de dois trabalhos acadêmicos feitos pelo autor, sendo um prévio e outro em desenvolvimento: a dissertação de mestrado "Caracterizando o imaginário belga acerca da imigração congolesa: uma análise a partir do jornal Le Soir", defendida no programa de pós-graduação em Estudos Culturais da Escola de Artes, Ciências e Humanidades da Universidade de São Paulo (EACH-USP), sob orientação dos professores Valéria Barbosa de Magalhães e José Renato de Campos Araújo; a pesquisa de doutorado "Le Soir, Le Monde, Folha de São Paulo: análise de abordagens sobre a diáspora congolesa", que está sendo conduzida por Felipe Antonio Honorato, sob orientação da professora Valéria Barbosa de Magalhães, no Programa de Pós-graduação em Mudança Social e Participação Política da Escola de Artes, Ciências e Humanidades da Universidade de São Paulo (EACH-USP), e constitui-se como uma extensão da dissertação de mestrado.

O trabalho tem, como fontes, artigos jornalísticos do jornal belga *Le Soir* e do jornal brasileiro Folha de São Paulo da década de 1990 e do início dos anos 2000, respectivamente, além de materiais acadêmicos.

Congoleses na Bélgica: o caso do Matongé

A comunidade congolesa na capital belga, mesmo antes da massificação dos fluxos migratórios entre os dois países em questão, ocorrida no início da década de 1990, formou seu reduto em Bruxelas: o quarteirão Matongé. O nome é uma referência a um bairro de Kinshasa, que, por sua vez, faz alusão ao nome de um fruto:

> E, primeiramente, porque Matonge? Originalmente, é o nome de uma fruta tropical, um pouco azeda e vermelha por dentro. E depois, é sobretudo o nome de um dos bairros mais badalados de Kinshasa, na comuna de Kalamu, e onde os jovens vão dançar, ouvir música e divertir-se até de madrugada[1]. (Gérard e Dewez 1994)

[1] Tradução do autor. Versão original: "Et pourquoi Matonge d'abord? À l'origine, c'est le nom d'un fruit tropical, un peu aigre et rouge à l'intérieur. Et puis, c'est surtout le nom d'un des quartiers les plus chauds de Kinshasa,

O quarteirão localiza-se em Ixelles e sua constituição está historicamente ligada a *Maison Africaine*, um albergue e espaço de apoio para estudantes e estagiários africanos na capital belga criada por ocasião da Expo 58 – a exposição mundial (Bourton 1996).

Durante as décadas de 1960 e 1970, a maioria dos africanos que frequentavam a região eram diplomatas ou estudantes. A partir do fim da década de 1980, o público se diversificou (Bourton 1996), mimetizando as características dos fluxos migratórios entre o então Zaire[2] e a Bélgica.

Seu epicentro é a *Gallerie Ixelles*, localizada na esquina das vias *Wavre* e *Ixelles* (Lamensch 1990). A galeria, em janeiro de 1990, tinha 60% dos seus estabelecimentos tocados por pessoas de origem zairense, dentre os quais, a grande maioria eram mulheres (Lamensch 1990). Apesar de a região ficar conhecida como reduto da comunidade congolesa, naqueles dias, a vizinhança era a mais cosmopolita possível: na área, haviam comércios administrados, dentre outras nacionalidades, por haitianos, russos, paquistaneses, espanhóis, italianos e também por belgas (Lamensch 1990).

Uma reportagem publicada por Michelle Lamensch em 1990 (Lamensch 1990) e outra, do mesmo ano, mas assinada pelo jornalista Serge Trimpont (Trimpont 1990), revelam uma rotina de constantes abusos e verificações, por parte das autoridades imigratórias, na região. Trimpont escreveu sobre Charles Musonda, um jogador de futebol zambiano do Anderlecht, clube de Bruxelas e um dos mais tradicionais do futebol belga. Considerado o 14º melhor jogador africano atuando no continente europeu no ano de 1989 pela premiação *Ballon d'Or africain*, promovida pela tradicional revista France Football, titular da seleção de seu país, eleito, por jornalistas de Botswana e da Zâmbia o melhor jogador africano de 1989, destaque de um dos maiores clubes da Bélgica, Musonda relatou que, em uma visita ao Matongé, nem mesmo ele escapou da abordagem dos *gendarmerie*:

> Estou completamente adaptado, agora, à vida em Bruxelas, diz ele. E então, eu tenho meus pontos de referência. Costumo passear pelo bairro de Matonge, onde tenho alguns amigos zairenses. Eu também às vezes encontro a polícia lá. Outro dia, um deles me parou perto do metrô para verificar meus papéis. Quando ele viu que eu era Charles Musonda, ele rapidamente se acalmou![3]. (Trimpont 1900)

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dans la commune de Kalamu, et où les jeunes vont danser, écouter de la musique et s'éclater jusqu'au petit matin".

[2] Entre 1971 e 1997, a atual República Democrática do Congo recebeu o nome de República do Zaire (Kisangani e Bobb 2010).

[3] Tradução do autor. Versão original: "Je suis complètement adapté, maintenant, à la vie bruxelloise, lance-t-il. Et puis, j'ai mes points de repère. Je vais très souvent me promener au quartier Matonge, où je compte pas mal d'amis zaïrois. Moi aussi, j'y rencontre parfois des policiers. L'autre jour encore, l'un d'eux m'a interpellé à proximité du métro pour vérifier mes papiers. Quand il a vu que j'étais Charles Musonda, il s'est vite calmé!".

Em meados de 1992 o Matongé foi tomado por uma verdadeira epidemia: o crack chegou à Bélgica. O grande centro de venda e consumo desta droga, um derivado da cocaína e de preço abaixo das demais, se estabeleceu no "quarteirão africano", na *rue Longue Vie*, entre seus cruzamentos com a c*haussée de Wavre* e a *rue de la Paix* (Wouters 1994). O trecho, neste período, foi apelidado de "corredor da morte" (Wouters 1994). Com a chegada do consumo da então nova droga, a criminalidade aumentou na região: os índices de assaltos e roubos cresceram. Uma reportagem escrita por Jean Wouters em 1994 denunciava também as constantes brigas e agitações na área, que assustavam os moradores (Wouters 1994). Um morador interpelado pelo jornalista discute sobre como um dos aspectos que podem ser interpretados como parte de um processo de marginalização da área – o estado de má conservação do bairro – estava contribuindo para o alastramento da epidemia do crack: "Os prédios estão vazios, os donos não se importam com suas propriedades e quando as casas não passam de favelas, são alugadas para africanos. É vergonhoso!"[4] (Wouters 1994).

Em 1994 assumiu como prefeito de Bruxelas Yves De Jonghe (Vantroyen 1994). De Jonghe começou uma política de frequentes operações policiais e de vigilância sanitária, além de impor aos bairros da cidade o fim do barulho em bares e estabelecimentos à 1 da manhã (Vantroyen 1994). A primeira operação deste tipo em seu mandato, noticiada em 25 de janeiro de 1994, ocorreu na vizinhança de *place du Châtelain*; o prefeito fez questão de frisar que o fato do Matongé não ter sido o primeiro destino provava a todos que ele não era racista (Vantroyen 1994). No entanto, sua opinião sobre a região e sobre os zairenses transbordava estereótipos: "Claro que ainda há muita gente boa em Matonge. Sabes, os zairenses são simpáticos, vivem a noite e gostam de festejar. Eu também, mas há limites"[5] (Vantroyen 1994).

A fama que o quarteirão tinha de ser uma região jovem e festeira, além da crescente no consumo do crack, com o passar do tempo, fez com que ele viesse a ser alvo de cada vez mais frequentes operações policiais, de vigilância sanitária e de controle migratório, causando uma escalada de tensão entre as autoridades e a comunidade imigrante africana. Em setembro de 1994, uma operação de controle sanitário conduzida em diversas galerias da região do Matongé em um final de tarde de quarta-feira terminou com tumulto e tiros de advertência disparados pela polícia (Vantroyen 1994). No total, foram 17 estabelecimentos visitados,

[4] Tradução do autor. Versão original: "Les immeubles se vident de leurs habitants, les propriétaires ne se soucient pas de leur bien et quand les maisons ne sont plus que des taudis, on les loue à des Africains. C'est honteux!".

[5] Tradução do autor. Versão original: "Bien sûr qu'il y a encore des tas de gens bien à Matonge. Vous savez, le Zaïrois est convivial, il vit la nuit et il aime faire la fête. Moi aussi, mais il y a des limites".

estando apenas 4 deles com todas as licenças e permissões de funcionamento regulares. No arrasto desta operação, 150 verificações de documentos foram feitas e 8 pessoas foram fichadas por estarem em situação migratória irregular (Vantroyen 1994).

Congoleses na África do Sul: o caso de Muizenberg

A maioria do grupo de 7 milhões de imigrantes congoleses no mundo concentra-se em países vizinhos, como Uganda, Ruanda, Tanzânia e Zâmbia (Schoumaker, Vause e Mobhe 2010).

A África do Sul, principalmente por sua estabilidade econômica e política, é vista como a "América da África" e atrai migrantes e refugiados de outras partes do continente (Owen 2015). A chegada desses imigrantes pelas fronteiras porosas do país alimenta uma retórica xenófoba na sociedade sul-africana, uma vez que essa potência regional africana apresenta altos índices de pobreza, desemprego e um sistema welfare inadequado que reduz sua capacidade de absorver a migração (Owen 2015).

Desde 1994, como o fim do Apartheid, houve um influxo de refugiados africanos e migrantes documentados para a África do Sul, provenientes de nações como Ruanda, Senegal, Somália, Nigéria e os dois Congos: em 2002, eles correspondiam a 38% da população imigrante total de 2.472 no país (Owen 2015). Ainda que esses fluxos mais consistentes sejam recentes, a migração de "outros africanos" para a África do Sul não é novidade, principalmente quando se trata de africanos provenientes de regiões da África Austral: durante o Apartheid, o país tinha tradição de importar mão de obra sazional de Moçambique e do Lesoto para o trabalho em suas minas (Owen 2015).

Além dos números demográficos, outro aspecto que torna os fluxos imigratórios de africanos para a África do Sul pós 1994 algo novo é a variedade de formas migratórias: antes quase que exclusivamente compostos por trabalhadores, agora abrangem requerentes de asilo, refugiados e migrantes econômicos - em 2002, por exemplo, a África do Sul liderou o ranking mundial de requisições de asilo recebidas (Owen 2015). Congoleses são parte significativa desses fluxos.

O histórico congolês de migração para a África do Sul pode ser dividido em três ondas. Segundo Joy Owen:

> Kadima (2001) sugere que a primeira onda de migração congolesa para a África do Sul ocorreu entre 1990 e 1992. No entanto, Bouillon (2001a) observa que os zairenses (congoleses) foram migrando para a África do Sul desde 1986. Na minha opinião, o primeiro fluxo de migração congolesa para a África do Sul ocorreu no início dos anos 1980, quando o presidente Mobutu consolidou seu estado de partido único na RDC. Apesar do apoio contínuo a Mobutu pelos Estados Unidos e outras potências como França e Bélgica, parte da geopolítica da Guerra Fria, o povo congolês sentiu a opressão de um estado pária, uma

> moeda desvalorizada, um sistema educacional falido e o incentivo de Mobutu ao *on se débrouille* (cuidar de nós mesmos)[6]. (Owen 2015, 49)

A autora segue, dizendo que:

> O período de 1990 a 1996/1997 pode ser considerado como a segunda onda de migração da RDC para a África do Sul. Kadima (2001:93) afirma que a migração para a África do Sul entre 1990 e 1992 foi realizada principalmente por congoleses de classe média "em busca de trabalho e melhor remuneração" e jovens em busca de educação superior"[7]. (Owen 2015, 48)

A terceira onda iniciou em 1997, com o fim da Segunda República, e segue a ocorrer até agora (Owen 2015).

Devido ao "desinteresse" e à "má disposição" do governo da África do Sul para com eles, a xenofobia, e à consequente condição de vulnerabilidade social, a maioria dos refugiados e migrantes congoleses depende de suas redes sociais pessoais para sobreviver no país: "Isso predispõe os transmigrantes congoleses à criação de redes sociais que se estendem além das linhas de classe, raciais, étnicas e nacionais"[8] (Owen 2015, 216).

Muizenberg

Muizenberg está localizado nos subúrbios da Cidade do Cabo: no passado, este bairro era predominantemente um lugar da classe média branca, negra, africana e imigrante, mas agora constitui uma opção de moradia barata na cidade, acessível para os refugiados e asilados (Owen 2015); também, "a maioria dos congoleses foi avisada para se afastar dos distritos da Cidade do Cabo"[9], recorrendo aos subúrbios como lar (Owen 2015, 58). Joy Owen (2015) estima que até 3.000 congoleses residam na área, a maioria deles provenientes de Kinshasa: na década de 1990, Muizenberg era frequentemente chamado de "Pequeno Congo".

Longe de seus dias mais gloriosos, a arquitetura de Muizenberg é qualificada como "desarrumada" e "restaurada" (Owen 2015). Os imigrantes congoleses são responsabilizados

[6] Tradução do autor. Versão original: "Kadima (2001) suggests that the first wave of Congolese migration to South Africa occurred between 1990 and 1992. However, Bouillon (2001a) notes that Zairians (Congolese) were migrating to South Africa from 1986. In my estimation, the first trickle of Congolese migration to South Africa occurred in the early 1980s, as President Mobutu entrenched his one-party state in the DRC. Despite Mobutu's continued backing by the United States and other powers like France and Belgium as part of Cold War geopolitics, Congolese people felt the oppression of a pariah state, a devalued currency, a failing educational system, and Mobutu's encouragement of on se débrouille (fend for ourselves)".

[7] Tradução do autor. Versão original: "The period from 1990 to 1996/1997 can be considered as the second wave of migration into South Africa from the DRC. Kadima (2001:93) states that migration into South Africa between 1990 and 1992 was undertaken mostly by middle-class Congolese "seeking work and better remuneration," and younger people in search of tertiary education".

[8]Tradução do autor. Versão original: "This predisposes Congolese transmigrants to the creation of social networks that extend beyond class, racial, ethnic and national lines".

[9] Tradução do autor. Versão original: *"*Most Congolese had been warned away from townships in C*ape Town".*

pelos sul-africanos pela deterioração da área, mesmo não existindo qualquer relação entre a chegada daqueles e a decadência da região (Owen 2015). Uma entrevista com a então presidente do Comitê Distrital de Melhoria local, Mariette, revela esse sentimento: a "mulher branca africânder" diz, entre muitas outras coisas, que os refugiados não respeitam os "locais" e a polícia, e que eles roubam e fazer outras "coisas ilegais" (Owen 2015, 63). A xenofobia dos sul-africanos de Muizenberg infelizmente não fica apenas na retórica:

> Homens e mulheres congoleses em Muizenberg tentaram não viajar de transporte público, principalmente de trem, pois vários foram assediados verbalmente. Um guarda de segurança congolês teve um destino muito pior quando foi jogado de um trem em movimento por moradores locais[10]. (Owen 2015, 45)

Congoleses no Brasil: o caso de Brás de Pina

Em 2 de agosto de 2009, as páginas C8 e C9 da seção "cotidiano" do jornal Folha de São Paulo foram quase que inteiramente dedicadas a contar a história de 4 refugiados da RDC moradores do Rio de Janeiro. A trajetória de todos eles se relaciona ao mote oferecido pelo título da reportagem, assinada por Fábio Grellet: "Um pedaço do Congo no Brasil" (Grellet 2009). "Um pedaço do Congo no Brasil" é uma clara referência a Brás de Pina, bairro na zona norte da capital fluminense onde, naquele período, vivia quantia significativa dos 286 refugiados congoleses habitantes da cidade (Grellet 2009).

A reportagem começa fazendo menção a um culto evangélico, que era acompanhado por "dezenas de africanos" (Grellet 2009), sendo celebrado em lingala numa igreja da favela Cinco Bocas, localizada no bairro (Grellet 2009). Laza Ndosi, pastor congolês que comandava a missa, explica que são dois os motivos para a existência da comunidade de nacionais do país da África Central na localidade da zona norte carioca: já que muitos ali fugiram sozinhos do Congo, nada melhor do que ficar próximo a conterrâneos; e, o principal seria o custo - "na favela ninguém paga água nem eletricidade" (Grellet 2009, p. C8), apesar do texto de Fábio Grellet inferir que tiroteios eram parte do cotidiano na comunidade (Grellet 2009).

Por abrigar muitos africanos em situação de refúgio, o bairro carioca contava com um abrigo da Cáritas, instituição ligada à igreja católica que oferece assistência a estrangeiros. O abrigo, no entanto, ao menos à época, não aceitava mulheres (Grellet 2009).

[10] Tradução do autor. Versão original: "Congolese men and women in Muizenberg tried not to travel by public transport, particularly the train, as a number had been verbally harassed. A Congolese security guard had suffered a much worse fate when he was thrown off a moving train by local residents".

Considerações finais: uma breve comparação entre o Matongé, Muizenberg e Brás de Pina

No sul ou no norte global, como se pode constatar através dos casos do Matongé, Muizenberg e Brás de Pina, os imigrantes congoleses ocupam a periferia dos centros urbanos, onde o custo de vida são menores e apropriados à condição de vulnerabilidade econômica e social em que estes vivem no exterior - como disse o pastor congolês sobre a favela Cinco Bocas, apesar dos constantes tiroteios, lá "ninguém paga água nem eletricidade".

Matongé e Muizenberg tornaram-se áreas periféricas após um processo de deterioração que, no caso do bairro da Cidade do Cabo, é visto, pelos nacionais, como responsabilidade dos imigrantes congoleses e de sua presença (Owen 2015).

A retórica dos belgas e sul-africanos sobre os congoleses no Matongé e em Muizenberg, respectivamente, se aproximam: como dito anteriormente, a então presidente do Comitê Distrital de Melhoria local de Muizenberg defendeu, entre muitas outras coisas, que os refugiados não respeitam os "locais" e a polícia, e que eles roubam e fazem outras "coisas ilegais" (Owen 2015, 63); M. Bliard, um joalheiro belga que mantinha um negócio fundado em 1924 por seu pai e estava na Gallerie Ixelles desde sua abertura (Lamensch 1990), também era o presidente do conselho de administração do local em 1990 (Lamensch 1990); ele dizia ser um dos responsáveis por manter a ordem ali: proibia mulheres de amamentarem no terraço, vigiava os cochilos públicos; pintava linhas no chão para que cada lojista respeitasse os limites de sua respectiva loja, pedia para alguns diminuir o barulho (Lamensch 1990). Para o belga, havia alguns africanos melhores que outros nos quesitos ordem e disciplina, e justifica dizendo: *"c'est la galerie la plus exotique de Belgique!"* (Lamensch 1990).

Analisando a inserção laboral de congoleses na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, Figueira e Masengu observam que a maioria dos congoleses que chegam ao Brasil nascem e/ou vivem na capital, Kinshasa (Figueira e Masengu 2020). Isso porque pessoas de outras regiões da RDC geralmente não têm condições financeiras para embarcar para países distantes (Figueira e Masengu 2020). Estes, quando migram, o fazem internamente ou para os países vizinhos, pois fora da capital a situação econômica é muito pior que em Kinshasa, que, apesar de ser um grande núcleo urbano, apresenta altas taxas de desemprego (Figueira e Masengu 2020). Soma-se a isso os fatos de Kinshasa ter o maior aeroporto internacional congolês e, no interior, boa parte das pessoas trabalharem no cultivo, seja na agricultura de subsistência ou como empregado em fazendas, ganhando muito pouco ou até mesmo trocando mão de obra por alimentos (Figueira e Masengu 2020). Tal característica é observada também na África

do Sul: segundo Joy Owen (2015), a maioria dos 3.000 congoleses que residem em Muizenberg são provenientes de Kinshasa.

No Brasil, de acordo com Lima (2011), a África e seus povos são representados de forma una: o continente é visto como um único país, e os africanos como um povo só que habita este país - por exemplo: como conta a reportagem "Um pedaço do Congo no Brasil" (Grellet 2009), a refugiada congolesa Eureka Bokufe chegou a Brás de Pina após ser avisada por outros estrangeiros que no bairro havia muitos "africanos" e, por isso, para lá ter resolvido ir (Grellet 2009).

O caso da África do Sul e do "Pequeno Congo" na Cidade do Cabo é a prova prática de que tal imaginário não existe na vida real: além da relatada xenofobia praticada por sul-africanos contra imigrantes congoleses, a própria autora do livro utilizado como base para descrever Muizenberg se refere aos refugiados congoleses como o "outro" africano falante de uma língua estrangeira (Owen 2015).

Para concluir, assim se resume a comparação entre os casos do Matongé, Muizenberg e Brás de Pina:

- No sul ou no norte global, os imigrantes congoleses ocupam a periferia dos centros urbanos, onde o custo de vida são menores e apropriados à condição de vulnerabilidade econômica e social em que estes vivem no exterior;
- Matongé e Muizenberg tornaram-se áreas periféricas após um processo de deterioração;
- A retórica dos belgas e sul-africanos sobre os congoleses no Matongé e em Muizenberg, respectivamente, se aproximam;
- Tanto em Brás de Pina como em Muizenberg, a maioria dos imigrantes congoleses são provenientes da capital da RDC, Kinshasa;
- O caso de Muizenberg contraria o imaginário que se tem no Brasil sobre África e seus povos, onde o continente é encarado como homogêneo: o congolês é visto como o "outro", que, apesar de nascer no mesmo continente que o sul-africano, fala uma língua distinta e tem diferentes traços culturais.

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